Financial Stability Report. November 2017 by Banco de España
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT 
11/2017

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT  NOVEMBER 2017

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT  NOVEMBER 2017
The cut-off date of this report: 30 October 2017.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes 
is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
© Banco de España, Madrid, 2017
ISSN: 1696-3520 (online)
ABBREVIATIONS (*)
€   Euro
AIAF  Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA  Average total assets
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS  Bank for International Settlements
BLS  Bank Lending Survey
bn   Billions
bp   Basis points
BRRD Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
CBE  Banco de España Circular
CBSO  Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCyB Countercyclical capital buffer
CCR  Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation
CDS  Credit Default Swap
CEBS  Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIOPS  Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
CET1 Common equity Tier 1 capital
CIs  Credit institutions
CNMV  Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS  Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs  Deposit institutions
EAD  Exposure at default
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB  European Central Bank
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESFS  European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB  European Systemic Risk Board
EU  European Union
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board
FLESB Forward-Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks
FROB  Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSA  Financial Services Authority
FSAP  Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSB  Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
FSR  Financial Stability Report
FVC  Financial vehicle corporation
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GDI  Gross disposable income
GDP  Gross domestic product
G-SIIs Global systemically important institutions
GVA  Gross value added
GVAmp  Gross value added at market prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
ICO  Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID   Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs  International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
IOSCO  International Organization of Securities Commissions
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association
JST Joint Supervisory Team
LGD  Loss given default
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
LTV  Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
(*)  The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of 
the Financial Stability Report.
m   Millions
MiFID  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs  Money market funds
NPISHs  Non-profit institutions serving households
NPLs  Non-performing loans
OFIs Other financial intermediaries
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions
OTC  Over the counter
PD  Probability of default
PER  Price earnings ratio
pp   Percentage points
RDL Royal Decree-Law
ROA  Return on assets
ROE  Return on equity
RWA  Risk-weighted assets
SCIs  Specialised credit institutions
SMEs  Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIV  Structured investment vehicle
SPV  Special purpose vehicle
SRI Systemic Risk Indicator
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TA   Total assets
TARP  Troubled Asset Relief Program
TLTROs Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations
VaR  Value at risk
WTO  World Trade Organisation
ISO COUNTRY CODES
AT  Austria
BE  Belgium
BG  Bulgaria
BR  Brazil
CH  Switzerland
CL  Chile
CN  China
CY  Cyprus
CZ  Czech Republic
DE  Germany
DK  Denmark
EE  Estonia
ES  Spain
FI  Finland
FR  France
GB  United Kingdom
GR  Greece
HR  Croatia
HU  Hungary
IE  Ireland
IT  Italy
JP  Japan
LT  Lithuania
LU  Luxembourg
LV  Latvia
MT  Malta
MX  Mexico
NL  Netherlands
NO  Norway
PL  Poland
PT  Portugal
RO  Romania
SE  Sweden
SI  Slovenia
SK  Slovakia
TR  Turkey
US  United States
CONTENTS
 
1 1.1 External environment of the euro area   21
1.2 Financial markets in the euro area and in Spain  25
1.3 The macroeconomic environment in the euro area and in Spain  27
 2.1 Banking risks  35
2.2 Profitability  56
2.3 Solvency  65
 3.1 Analysis of systemic vulnerabilities  73
 
 Annex 1. Consolidated balance sheet  81
 Annex 2. Consolidated income statement  82
OVERVIEW  17
    MACROECONOMIC 
RISKS AND 
FINANCIAL 
MARKETS   21
2   BANKING RISKS, 
PROFITABILITY 
AND SOLVENCY  35
3   MACROPRUDENTIAL 
ANALYSIS AND 
POLICY  73
4   ANNEX  81

Table 1 Risk factors  18
Chart A Financial revenue and costs and net interest margin  18
Chart B Resident private sector NPLs and NPL ratio  18
Chart C Volatility indicator (VIX)  19
Chart D Bank credit risk premia. 5-year CDSs  19
Chart E Spanish risk premium and spread in relation to italian debt  19
Chart F Stock market indices  19
Chart 1.1 Growth indicators  21
  A GDP growth. Advanced economies 
 B 2017 GDP growth forecasts. Advanced economies
 C GDP growth. Emerging economies
 D 2017 GDP growth forecasts. Emerging economies
Chart 1.2 Labour market in advanced economies  22
 A Wages and unemployment: advanced economies
 B Unemployment: advanced economies
Chart 1.3 International financial market indicators  24
 A Stock exchange indices
 B Corporate spreads. United States and EMBI global
 C Long-term interest rates
 D Exchange rates against US dollar
 E Capital flows to emerging markets
 F Volatility index (VIX)
Chart 1.4 Financial markets in the euro area  26
 A Implied volatility
 B Bank credit risk premia. 5-year CDSs
 C Stock exchange indices
 D Cyclically adjusted PER
 E Sovereign debt 10-year yield
 F Yield curve slope
Chart 1.5 GDP growth and forecasts  27
 A Euro area
 B Spain
Chart 1.6 Spanish economy. Non-financial sectors and external sector  29
 A Households
 B Non-financial corporations
 C General government
 D External sector
Chart 2.1 International exposure. Financial assets   35
Chart 2.2 International exposure. Geographical breakdown of loans   36
 A Geographical breakdown of loans
 B Geographical breakdown of loans by counterparty
Chart 2.3 International exposure. Loans  37
LIST OF CHARTS AND TABLES
Chart 2.4 International exposure. Activities in local currency   37
 A International exposures by currency 
 B Geographical breakdown of international exposures by currency
Chart 2.5 NPL ratio   38
 A NPL ratio in business abroad
 B European NPL ratios
Chart 2.6 NPL ratio. Non-financial corporations and households   39
 A Non-financial corporations
 B Households
Chart 2.7 Year-on-year rate of change in credit to the resident private sector   39
Chart 2.8 Credit to SMEs and credit conditions   40
 A Credit to non-financial corporations, by size of firm
 B New credit granted from January to August
 C Acceptance rate of loan applications
 D New loan interest rates
Chart 2.9 NPLs. Resident private sector   43
 A Non-performing loans
 B  Distribution of household NPLs except housing by rate of change
 C Year-on-year rate of change in NPLs, by sector of activity
Chart 2.10 Flow of resident private sector NPLs  44
 A NPLs between December 2015 and June 2016
 B NPLs between December 2016 and June 2017
Chart 2.11 NPL ratio. Resident private sector   47
 A NPL ratio
 B Year-on-year change in NPL ratio
 C NPL ratio, by sector of activity
 D NPL ratio, by size of firm
Chart 2.12 Systemic risk   49
 A Systemic risk indicator (SRI)
 B Contribution of Spanish banks to systemic risk measured through COVAR
Chart 2.13 Wholesale funding   50
 A Eonia trading volume
 B Eurosystem balance sheet and liquidity surplus
 C Outstanding amount provided through Eurosystem tenders
 D Main issues of Spanish institutions in medium and long-term wholesale markets
Chart 2.14 International exposure. Deposits  54
Chart 2.15 International exposure. Geographical breakdown of deposits   54
 A Geographical breakdown of deposits
 B Geographical breakdown of deposits by counterparty
Chart 2.16 Liquidity coverage ratio. European comparison  55
Chart 2.17 Retail funding  55
 A Deposits from households and non-financial corporations, and average interest rates
 B Deposits from households and non-financial corporations
 C Loan-to-deposit ratio in relative terms
 D  Contribution of returns and of net subscriptions to change in net asset value of 
investment funds
Chart 2.18 Consolidated profitability  56
 A  Breakdown of the change in consolidated profit attributed to the parent institution
 B Financial asset impairment losses as a % of ATA
Chart 2.19 Profitability. European comparison  58
 A ROE
 B Cost-to-income ratio
Chart 2.20 Profitability. Business in Spain  59
 A Financial revenue and costs and net interest margin
 B Breakdown of net fee and commission income
Chart 2.21 Employees and branches. European comparison  60
 A Employees and branches. 2000 – 2017. Business in Spain
 B Employees and branches. 2008 – 2017. Business in Spain
 C Number of branches per one thousand inhabitants
 D Number of employees per branch
Chart 2.22 Market information  64
 A Banking stock market indices
 B Price-to-book-value ratio of the banking sector
 C Banking stock market indices
Chart 2.23 Capital ratios  65
Chart 2.24 Breakdown of own funds and risk-weighted assets  66
 A Levels of capital and risk exposure
 B Breakdown of own funds
 C  Breakdown of CET1 ratio as % of RWAs
 D Breakdown of risk-weighted assets
Chart 2.25 GDP growth forecast under baseline and adverse scenarios  68
 A GDP growth under baseline and adverse scenarios
 B GDP year-on-year growth forecast under baseline and adverse scenarios
Chart 2.26 Impact on fully-loaded CET1 ratio. Institutions with significant international 
activity  69
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.27 Impact on fully-loaded CET1 ratio. Other SSM institutions  70
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.28 Impact on fully-loaded CET1 ratio. Less significant institutions  70
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.29 Funding withdrawal scenarios  71
 A Withdrawal of household and SME funding
 B Withdrawal of wholesale and central bank funding
Chart 2.30 Impact on liquidity coverage ratio  72
 A SSM institutions
 B Less significant institutions
Chart 3.1 Heat map levels  73
Chart 3.2 Heat map by sub-category  74
Chart 3.3 Credit-to-GDP gap  77
 A Credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend
 B Change in credit-to-GDP gap and contribution of its components

LIST OF BOXES
Box 1.1 The economic impact of uncertainty arising from political tensions in Catalonia  31
 A  Hypothetical scenarios of changes in synthetic indicator of uncertainty: 
financial market measurements
 B  Hypothetical scenarios of changes in synthetic indicator of uncertainty 
over economic policies and the political situation
 C  Hypothetical scenarios of changes in synthetic indicator of uncertainty based 
on measures of disagreement between economic agents
 D  Cumulative effects on real GDP of the hypothetical scenarios of an increase 
in uncertainty
Box 2.1 Change in credit: relationship to profitability, NPLs and solvency 41
 A Percentiles of chance in credit by level of ROE
 B Correlation between change in credit and ROE
 C Percentiles of chance in credit by level of NPL ratio
 D Correlation between change in credit and NPL ratio
 E Percentiles of chance in credit by level of CET1 ratio
 F Correlation between change in credit and CET1 ratio
Box 2.2 Non-performing loans: economic setting, problems and treatment  45
 A Volume of NPLs. European comparison
 B NPLs to the resident private sector
 C Resident private sector’s NPL ratio
 D NPLs and quarter-on-quarter rate of change in GDP
 E Coverage ratio by institutional sector
 F Coverage after considering collateral value by institutional sector
Box 2.3 Effects of bank resolution actions in the euro area on the market of eligible instruments 
with loss-absorbing capacity  51
 A Secondary market spreads to mid-swaps and European banking sector stock index
 B Interest rate spreads between AT1 and T2 instruments denominated in euros
 C  Price change of euro-denominated subordinated bonds (6 June 2017 to 9 June 2017)
 D  Cumulative price change of stressed and total subordinated bonds, since 9 June
 E  Price change of euro-denominated subordinated bonds (22 June 2017 to 30 June 2017)
 F  Cumulative price change of stressed and total subordinated bonds, since 30 June
Box 2.4 Banco Popular Español resolution process  57
 A Banco Popular Español resolution process
Box 2.5 Access to the Spanish bank branch network by size of municipality  61
 A Distribution of bank branches by size of municipality (in terms of population). 2016
 B Distribution of population by size of municipality (in terms of population). 2016
 C Branches per 1,000 inhabitants by size of municipality. 1998-2016
 D Growth in population and number of branches by size of municipality. 1998-2016
 E Growth in population and number of branches by size of municipality. 1998-2007
 F Growth in population and number of branches by size of municipality. 2007-2016
 G Population without access to a bank branch in their municipality. 2007-2016
 H Municipalities without access to a bank branch. 2007-2016
Box 3.1 Comparison of methodologies used to calculate the credit-to-GDP gap  76
 A Spain’s credit-to-GDP gap according to different sources
Box 3.2 Material third countries for the purposes of the countercyclical capital buffer  78
 A  Largest exposures to third countries by exposure category according to the 
materiality criterion
 B Credit-GDP gap in third countries that meet the materiality threshold in Spain
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2017
OVERVIEW
The latent geopolitical tensions have not prevented the economic recovery, at the 
international level, from holding on its positive path. Activity has picked up in the developed 
and emerging economies alike (with the exception of the United Kingdom among the 
former). Short-term projections have not only retained their previous tone but also include 
upward revisions in economic growth and are accompanied by increases in confidence 
indices and in employment figures. And this under highly relaxed financial conditions 
characterised by low volatility in most asset prices, a reduction in risk premia, a rise in 
stock market indices (albeit with some correction to the levels in the opening months of the 
year), a declining trend in government debt yields and policy interest rates that are broadly 
accommodative. Inflation levels, in the case of the advanced economies, remain below 
central bank targets.
The situation of stability on financial markets has passed through to the banking sector, in 
particular in Europe. There, despite certain resolution actions at individual banks, no 
significant adjustments on markets have been observed. Indeed, bank share prices have 
trended even more favourably than those of overall indices in recent months. In any event, 
the prospect of low profitability, combined with the still-high volume of non-productive 
assets on bank balance sheets and with future regulatory demands, continue to arouse 
some uncertainty over the outlook for the banking industry.
In 2017 to date, the Spanish economy has held on the expansionary course on which it 
embarked four years ago, posting growth rates higher than those of the main euro area 
economies. Specifically, GDP is expected to have grown at a rate 0.8% in Q3 (3.1% year-
on-year), on INE preliminary estimates. The sound pace of output growth is being reflected 
in the positive behaviour of the labour market, with a reduction in the unemployment rate 
to 16.4% in Q3, 2.5 pp down on a year earlier. The latest Banco de España projections, 
published at the end of September, envisage a continuation of the expansionary phase, 
although there is expected to be a moderate slowdown in the coming quarters as some of 
the factors driving activity since the start of the recovery lose momentum. Against this 
background, the uncertainty further to the independence challenge in Catalonia might 
translate into a lower level of activity and employment in the coming months, as is 
subsequently analysed in the Financial Stability Report (FSR).
In the foregoing setting, Spanish deposit institutions’ consolidated assets fell by 2.8% in 
June 2017 compared with the same period a year earlier, owing essentially to business in 
Spain. Consolidated earnings in the first half of 2017 were up 19% on the same period in 
2016, taking the return on equity (ROE) to 7%. It should be pointed out that these figures 
do not include the adverse results of Banco Popular Español whose resolution was 
decided by the Single Resolution Board (SRB) last June. Under the heading of business in 
Spain, net interest income narrowed once more, with a decline of 1.8% year-on-year, as 
did ROE, which stood at 5.9%.
In any event, Spanish banks’ solvency (11.9% of CET1 capital) remains above the minimum 
regulatory level, although it has fallen by around 70 bp from its June 2016 figure, influenced 
by the bank resolution mentioned above. However, following the forward-looking 
assessment of the Spanish banking system’s resilience under an adverse macroeconomic 
scenario, in line with that used by the IMF in the stress test in its Financial Sector 
1 Key developments
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Assessment Program (FSAP), it is observed how, in aggregate terms, the Spanish banking 
system would be capable of maintaining solvency levels above the minimum regulatory 
levels required.
Nonetheless, the foregoing setting is not free from risks. The favourable conditions on 
financial markets may give rise to a build-up of imbalances to such an extent that, were the 
situation to turn around owing to the materialisation of any of those risks, be they political 
in nature – both at the national and international level – or of some other type, they might 
generate high instability.
Identified below are the main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish financial system.
In addition to the two factors highlighted, there is another risk factor to be taken into 
account, namely the political tension in Catalonia and its potential repercussions for 
funding conditions on the capital markets and for the Spanish economy as a whole. 
The ongoing compression of the net interest margin in domestic business, as a result of 
the low level of interest rates with which deposit institutions are operating, significantly 
restricts their income-generating capacity. Chart A shows, with some perspective, how the 
net interest margin has trended. On the assets side, the continuous decline in income 
generation can be seen. On the liabilities side the pattern is very similar (containment in the 
cost of funds), but with increasingly less scope to withstand further cuts, since the natural 
limit associated with the zero rate of financing from deposits has practically been reached. 
As a result, the net interest margin continues to trend at historically low levels.
2 Risk factors
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The continuing decline in the volume of business in Spain and the high level of non-
productive assets on bank balance sheets are further factors of pressure on the income 
statement (see Chart B). In any event, emphasis should be placed on the progress made 
regarding the reduction in the volume of assets classified as non-performing in recent 
years. The sustained improvement in macroeconomic conditions, both in activity and in 
employment, along with active management of credit are contributing to this progressive 
decline in the volume of non-productive assets, which is directly reflected in the NPL ratio 
and in the statement of income. 
Admittedly, financial markets are evidencing high stability, as reflected in the low volatility 
and risk premium levels (see Charts C and D). But the abrupt reversal of this situation in 
the face of certain latent risks materialising, such as an unforeseen change in monetary 
policy expectations or a reassessment of investor risk appetite, might lead to a tightening 
of financial conditions with adverse repercussions on the financial system as a whole and 
with immediate effects in terms of worsening the outlook for profitability and income 
generation and, ultimately, on economic activity in general. 
With regard to the factor of risk in Catalonia, a potential heightening, or prolongation, of the 
political situation might adversely impact the economic outlook and financial stability in Spain. 
Greater uncertainty might dent economic agents’ confidence and thereby affect their spending 
and investment decisions, subsequently exerting a negative impact on economic activity and 
employment (see Box 1.1). Moreover, uncertainty and confidence problems might prompt the 
2.2  CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL 
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tightening of financing conditions for the resident sectors as a whole. Charts E and F show 
the impact of the greater uncertainty created in Catalonia, in the run-up to the cut-off date for 
this FSR on the government debt market and on share prices.
The aforementioned risks are considered in greater detail in this FSR, seeking to show 
their interrelatedness and impact on the financial system, in particular on the business 
conducted by Spanish deposit institutions, and their potential repercussions for their 
profitability and their solvency position. 
Chapter 3, as in previous editions of the FSR, describes the macroprudential stance 
pursued by the Banco de España in recent months. In particular, the systemic risks map 
and the recent changes therein are presented, together with the policy decisions taken on 
the basis of the associated indicators. 
3  Macroprudential 
analysis and policy 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2017
 1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Judging by the GDP growth figures for the different regions in Q2 (see Chart 1.1), the global 
economic recovery appears to be underpinned by a setting of expansionary monetary 
policies and favourable financial conditions. Indeed, activity rose significantly in the main 
advanced economies in 2017 Q2, with the exception of the United Kingdom, where GDP is 
starting to reflect the erosion of household purchasing power associated with the increase in 
inflation resulting from the sizeable depreciation sterling has undergone. In the emerging 
economies activity also rose in the first half of the year, with the greater-than-expected 
buoyancy of domestic demand in China, enhanced external demand in other economies and 
some improvement in the terms of trade for commodities producers. The latest high-
frequency indicators confirm the continuity of this greater dynamism in Q3, with increases in 
confidence indices and in the activity and employment figures in both areas. Against this 
background, the short-term growth forecasts remain on a path of gradual recovery, and even 
evidence upward revisions. One of the main exceptions to this global trend is the United 
Kingdom, an important trading and financial partner of Spain. In the UK the uncertainty 
surrounding Brexit is restricting growth. 
Despite the progressive increase in demand pressure in the advanced economies and the 
improvement in their labour markets (with unemployment rates at historical lows in some 
cases), inflation rates and the pace of wage growth remained very moderate, in comparison
1.1  External environment 
of the euro area 
Global growth is proving
more robust, especially
in the short term…
…in a setting of low inflation
in the advanced economies,...
SOURCES: Datastream and Consensus.
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with other recovery cycles (see Chart 1.2). Hence, except in the United Kingdom, where 
inflation stands above the Bank of England’s target owing to the impact of the depreciation 
of sterling, inflation rates in the main advanced economies are still some distance off the 
attendant targets. And wage growth is lower than what low unemployment rates should 
infer, a fairly widespread phenomenon in recent years which might be explained by various 
factors (low productivity growth, low past inflation rates, a degree of under-utilisation of the 
labour factor, composition effects towards lower-productivity and lower-wage jobs, etc.).
In this setting, the process of normalisation of monetary policy in the United States is 
following its expected course, although discrepancies remain between market expectations 
about rate rises and the Federal Reserve’s projections. Adding to these considerations are 
the effects that the ongoing reduction of the Fed’s balance sheet may have on financial 
markets, a reduction that has already been approved at the September meeting of the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), following the course announced at the June 
meeting, entailing the start of the process in October. There is greater uncertainty 
surrounding US fiscal policy. Although it is still the government’s wish to approve a 
substantial fiscal stimulus programme, there is notable division in the US Congress about 
its design and size. Compounding this are the difficulties in raising the debt ceiling (despite 
the recent agreement to defer the problem a few more months), something which in the 
past has tended to arouse concern on the financial markets, and in approving the 
expenditure budget for the coming year. 
China, the biggest of all the emerging economies, has maintained high growth during 2017 
with moderate inflation, in a setting in which both the central bank and other regulators 
have adopted a series of measures to encourage the reduction of debt in the economy 
(particularly that of State-owned corporations). Moreover, given the accumulation of 
international reserves and the appreciation of the renminbi in recent months, there has 
been an easing of some of the regulations affecting foreign exchange markets. In the 
coming months, Chinese economic policy will foreseeably resume its focus on the 
transition towards a new model of economic growth that enables the current spare capacity 
and excess debt to be reduced, even though it may entail lower growth rates. If this course 
is not followed, there is a risk of the build-up of imbalances triggering an abrupt adjustment 
in this economy with global repercussions. 
...uncertainty over
the economic policies
in the United States
and China…
… and the persistence
of certain risks in several 
emerging economies 
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Economic activity in Mexico during the first half of 2017 remained dynamic and the 
slowdown expected by analysts and financial markets as a result of the increase in 
uncertainty associated with potential changes in US economic policy and more restrictive 
fiscal and monetary policies did not materialise. Indeed, the Mexican peso has recently 
appreciated, to the point of reversing in full the ground it lost after last November’s US 
presidential election. This turnaround reflects a less negative perception of the results of 
the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and a greater 
probability that in next year’s presidential elections in Mexico a moderate candidate will be 
elected. However, the uncertainty surrounding both processes has not been dispelled and 
might re-emerge in the coming months. 
Brazil emerged from a deep and lengthy recession in 2017 Q1. The correction of the external 
imbalance, the high stability on financial markets and the rapid correction of inflation (which 
currently stands below the central bank’s target) have been the main drivers of the recovery, 
as they have provided some alleviation to households’ real income and have enabled the 
central bank to shave 600 bp off its policy rate since October last year. The deterioration in 
public finances has also been halted, although the situation remains complicated. The fiscal 
consolidation strategy led to the approval of an amendment to the Brazilian constitution to 
include a fiscal rule freezing real growth in public spending, but other necessary reforms 
(especially in pensions) have still not been approved owing to the heightened political risk. 
In fact, this is the most significant risk for the Brazilian economy in the coming months, as 
it could prompt the financial markets to react unfavourably. 
Recent economic developments in Turkey have been relatively favourable, with robust 
GDP growth in the first half of the year (over 5% year-on-year), thanks to the stimulus 
measures introduced by the government in late 2016, to improved confidence and to the 
favourable external environment, with a significant pick-up in tourism and in exports to the 
EU. However, the situation of the Turkish economy remains complex, against a background 
in which activity may be expected to lose momentum as the government’s stimulus 
measures peter out, and in which the central bank’s room for manoeuvre to soften its 
restrictive monetary policy is limited by inflation rates that stand at over 10%. 
The conditions on global financial markets throughout the period analysed have been very 
benign. Stock markets rose (see Chart 1.3.A), reaching historical highs in the United 
States, and credit spreads narrowed (see Chart 1.3.B). Moreover, government debt yields 
(see Chart 1.3.C) in most of the developed countries moved on a declining trend during 
this period. The most significant movement was in the United States, where long-term 
interest rates stabilised at around 2%, a level close to that recorded before the presidential 
election. On the foreign exchange markets, in a setting in which expectations eased about 
the scope of the new US government’s expansionary fiscal programme and about the 
pace of policy interest rate rises, the dollar depreciated notably against most currencies 
(see Chart 1.3.D), with the most noteworthy fall being that against the euro. As a result, 
financial conditions in the developed economies – particularly in the case of the United 
States – eased further and spread to many emerging markets. 
Another notable characteristic of the developments on financial markets was the continuing 
very low volatility of the prices of most assets. This behaviour was particularly striking in 
the case of long-term interest rates in the United States, whose volatility stands far below 
the historical average recorded in cycles of official interest rate rises, such as the present 
one. This low volatility may be the consequence of the prospect of monetary normalisation 
moving at a very gradual pace, but it may also have come about owing to more persistent 
Mexico has maintained
its economic dynamism,
but uncertainty has not been 
dispelled
Brazil has emerged from
a deep-seated crisis
and has managed to halt
the deterioration in its public 
finances, although the political 
risk remains high 
The Turkish economy
has fared favourably, thanks
to the stimuli introduced
by the government
and the external environment, 
although the economic 
situation remains complex 
The financial markets show 
significant stability …
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factors such as the change in market structure towards agents with passive investment 
strategies and to the emergence of products with which volatility can be negotiated and of 
new instruments that provide for the implementation of investment strategies that opt to 
keep volatility low in the medium term. 
In the case of the emerging markets, the context of low volatility and appetite for risk 
boosted portfolio capital inflows (see Chart 1.3.E), the appreciation of currencies, further 
declines in sovereign spreads (in some cases to levels close to historical lows) and a surge 
in stock market prices, especially in Latin America. These favourable conditions also 
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spread to the primary markets, and were felt both in issuance volume (in the year to mid-
September 2017 placements were 25% up) and in the type of issuers, with countries that 
had hitherto not gained access to the market. 
These benign market conditions pose the question as to whether market sentiment is 
based solely on economic fundamentals or if there might also be some degree of risk 
complacency, motivated by yield search in an environment of very low interest rates. In 
principle, economic indicators appear to have accompanied market trends and this would 
point to the market assessment being sound. Nonetheless, these conditions would not be 
altogether consistent with the high global political uncertainty and the rise in geopolitical 
tensions in some regions, along with the increase in political risk and a worse assessment 
of certain emerging economies by rating agencies.
Against this background, a reassessment of the effects of political uncertainty might 
trigger marked changes in asset prices and, thereby, an increase both in long-term interest 
rates and in their volatility (see Chart 1.3.F). Likewise, a scant reaction by financial 
conditions to the progressive normalisation of monetary policy in the United States might 
lead to a more intensive rise in interest rates. 
The effects of some of the scenarios might impact those more vulnerable segments where 
there is high debt, as is the case with some companies with a low credit rating in the 
United States. As to the emerging economies, valuations appear less out of kilter, although 
debt in the business sector continues to increase (above all in Asia and, in particular, at 
Chinese real estate developers) and greater penetration by foreign investors is observed in 
national sovereign debt markets. 
Finally, the persistence over a long period of low levels of volatility might give rise to a 
build-up of imbalances in the financial sector, stemming basically from a greater appetite 
for risk and impaired quality of measurement of the risks assumed through the habitual 
models based on volatility indices. In this respect, it is noteworthy that an increase in the 
price of hedging against extreme events or a rise in volatility has been observed. 
In line with the rest of the main international financial markets, price volatility on the euro 
area markets has held in recent months at historically low levels (see Chart 1.4.A). Credit 
risk premia have also been at low levels, falling further in some cases such as, in particular, 
that of securities issued by banks, without any episodes of contagion having been 
observed following the resolutions applied to certain institutions in the area that were in a 
position of weakness (see Chart 1.4.B). Contributing to these favourable developments 
have been the global factors mentioned in the previous section, other more specific factors 
in Europe, and, in particular, the diminishing political uncertainty and the improvement in 
macroeconomic expectations and in the outlook for the banking sector. 
Stock market overall indices, having moved on a rising path from the summer of 2016 to 
May this year, evidenced moderate declines thereafter until late August which were 
subsequently reversed (as a result, the Euro Stoxx 50 stood 2.2% above its end-April level 
at the cut-off date for this FSR - see Chart 1.4.C). The more unfavourable performance of 
euro area corporate shares compared with that of US companies (the S&P 500 climbed 
7.4% during the same period) might be linked, at least in part, to the appreciation of the 
euro insofar as that might have an adverse impact on euro area companies’ profits. 
Comparing prices with cyclically adjusted earnings reveals ratios below pre-crisis levels 
(see Chart 1.4.D) and their historical averages, which is compatible with there being no 
… though it is difficult to 
identify the factors behind 
these highly favourable 
developments 
Indeed, some market 
segments might
be susceptible to abrupt 
changes in their valuations 
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and in Spain
Price volatility and credit risk 
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generalised overvaluations on the euro area stock exchanges. The stock market prices of 
European banks have trended somewhat more favourably than the overall indices, in line 
with events on the fixed-income markets (the Euro Stoxx banks index rose 3.4%). 
In the case of government debt, 10-year interest rates have held relatively stable in recent 
months at historically low levels, and generally no significant changes in yield spreads over 
the German benchmark have been observed (see Chart 1.4.E). That reflects the market’s 
expectation that an accommodative monetary policy will be maintained over a prolonged 
Long-term government
debt yields and the slope
of the yield curves
are at historically low levels 
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a 5-day moving average.
b The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of share price to the 10-year moving average of earnings. The dotted lines represent the historical averages 
of the series from 02.01.2005.
c Difference between the 10-year and the 3-month rate. The dotted lines represent the historical averages of the series from 01.01.2001.
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period. In line with these expectations, the slope of the yield curves on these markets is at 
lower values than the historical average (see Chart 1.4.F), although that might also reflect 
an abnormally low term premium. 
The performance of Spanish financial markets was generally in line with that of other euro 
area markets, although the behaviour of prices has tended to be less favourable, especially 
during recent weeks, which partly reflects the uncertainty generated by the political tensions 
in Catalonia. Thus, from late August to the cut-off date for this FSR the Ibex35 had increased 
by only 1.4% (compared with the 7% rise in the Euro Stoxx 50) while the Spanish 10-year 
government debt yield spread over the German benchmark rose by 4 bp to 113 bp.
In short, the euro area financial markets are showing high stability, as reflected in the low 
levels of volatility and of risk premia. However, as on other international markets, this 
situation might be abruptly reversed in the event of specific geopolitical risks materialising, 
or of investors reassessing their appetite for risk. That would lead to a tightening of financial 
conditions that might have adverse repercussions for financial stability. In addition to 
global risk factors, the Spanish financial markets are exposed to other specific risks and, 
in particular, to those relating to political tensions in Catalonia.
During the first half of 2017, the dynamism of economic activity in the euro area increased, 
to a year-on-year rate of 2.3% in Q2 (see Chart 1.5.A), while becoming more generalised 
across sectors and countries. This favourable behaviour led to an upward revision of the 
ECB’s growth forecasts for the current year, which stood in September (the date of the 
latest available projections) at 2.2%, and at 1.8% and 1.7%, respectively, for 2018 and 
2019. The continuing recovery in the euro area economy over the next two years is 
expected to be driven by domestic demand (against a background of highly favourable 
financial conditions, further progress in the deleveraging of all sectors and the sound 
behaviour of the labour market) and by a likewise positive contribution of exports, 
underpinned by the foreseeable pick-up in global demand and despite the recent 
appreciation of the euro. 
Despite this greater recent dynamism in activity, the year-on-year growth rate of the HICP 
has continued to fluctuate around 1.5% in recent months (1.5% in September), although 
its course continued to be notably affected by base effects derived from the movements 
in oil prices. These same developments may temporarily lead in the coming months to 
The performance of Spanish 
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figures even below 1%. Excluding the least stable components (energy and unprocessed 
food), the core measure of inflation rose slightly from 0.8% in March 2017 to 1.3% in 
September. Nonetheless, the appreciation of the euro and the more-moderate-than-
expected behaviour of domestic costs led the ECB to revise its inflation forecast for the 
coming years slightly downwards, to 1.2% and 1.5%, respectively, in 2018 and 2019. The 
inflation expectations implicit in market-traded asset prices also continue to show levels 
below the ECB objective. 
Against this backdrop, the ECB Governing Council has in recent months retained its 
expansionary monetary policy stance, considering that for the economic recovery to 
firm in the area, which is needed to attain the inflation objectives, the maintenance of 
accommodative monetary conditions continues to be required over a prolonged period 
and at least until a sustained adjustment in the inflation path consistent with the 
medium-term reference, of a rate below or close to 2%, is observed. At its meeting of 
26 October, the Governing Council approved an extension of its asset purchase 
programme for nine months to September 2018, although with a lower amount 
purchases (€30 billion per month, as opposed to the current amount of €60 billion), 
applicable from January 2018. 
The ECB’s maintenance of accommodative monetary conditions, along with progress in 
correcting imbalances within the area and the global economic recovery, should prompt 
the more dynamic behaviour of prices and costs, thereby boosting inflation rates upwards 
in a sustained fashion and providing for a progressive normalisation of monetary and 
financial conditions in the euro area. However, this central scenario continues to be subject 
to certain risks. These relate, first, to the robustness of the economic expansion (at the 
European and international levels), in a setting in which potential growth has been revised 
to a lesser extent than its short-term dynamism; and further, to the potentially adverse 
consequences for financial stability of a prolonged scenario of lax financial conditions, 
which might lead to agents incurring excessive debt. 
In 2017 to date, the Spanish economy has held on the expansionary course initiated four 
years ago, posting growth rates higher than those of the main euro area economies. 
Specifically, GDP is expected to have grown at a rate of 0.8% in Q3 (3.1% year-on-year), 
on INE preliminary estimates. The latest Banco de España projections, published at the 
end of September, envisage a continuation of the expansionary phase, although there is 
expected to be a moderate slowdown in the coming quarters as some of the factors 
driving activity since the start of the recovery lose momentum, such as the strong decline 
in oil prices from 2014 to 2016, the expansionary stance of budgetary policy in 2015 and 
2016, and the materialisation in the early stages of the recovery of the spending and 
investment decisions that had been postponed when uncertainty during the crisis had 
been at a height. Against this background, the uncertainty further to the independence 
challenge in Catalonia might translate into a lower level of activity and employment in the 
coming months.  
Turning to prices, following the rise in inflation in the opening months of the year 
– prompted by the behaviour of oil prices – the year-on-year rate of change of the Spanish 
CPI fell from 2.3% in March 2017 to 1.8% in September (the latest available figure). Price 
developments in the coming quarters will continue to be highly influenced by the trajectory 
of the energy component, which will prompt a further decline in the overall inflation rate 
until the opening months of 2018. Then, a mild rising trend is expected to come about 
further to the foreseeable gradual reduction in the economy’s degree of slack.  
The Eurosystem has 
retained all its conventional 
and non-conventional 
expansionary measures 
although it announced a 
reduction in the volume of 
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January 2018
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The favourable macroeconomic environment continued to be conducive to an improvement 
in the financial position of Spanish households and non-financial corporations. Against the 
background of a moderate increase in new lending business, the aggregate outstanding 
balance of loans granted to the aforementioned sectors has continued to fall to date in 
2017. Incomes, by contrast, moved on an expanding trend, in line with the increase in 
economic activity (see Charts 1.6.A and 1.6.B). In the case of households, the unemployment 
rate dipped to 16.4% in 2017 Q3, 2.5 pp down on the same period a year earlier, and 
nominal gross disposable income per capita continued to grow at a rate of slightly over 
2%. Non-financial corporations likewise saw a significant increase in their ordinary profit 
in the first half of the current year (of 10.3% compared with the same period a year earlier, 
in the case of the companies reporting to the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office Quarterly Survey).1 This increase has come about following the previous rise of 
33% in 2016 as a whole, meaning that the ordinary return on equity for these corporations 
currently stands at around 9.4%. As a result, the debt and debt burden ratios of households 
and corporations continued to decline in the first half of 2017, while total net household 
wealth as a percentage of GDP rose by almost 9 pp over that same period. 
1  Excluding those in the energy sector, whose atypical behaviour and high weight in the quarterly sample distort 
the aggregate results. 
The financial position
of households and non-
financial corporations 
continued to improve...
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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The general government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP continued to decline (see 
Chart 1.6.C). Given the positive effect on public finances arising from the increase in 
activity, the current fiscal policy stance may be qualified as neutral, which is in contrast to 
its expansionary behaviour in the two previous years. However, the level of public debt 
relative to GDP remains high, at around 100%, evidencing the need to make additional 
budgetary consolidation efforts. 
The still-high public sector debt contributes to the Spanish economy’s international net 
financial position being notably in debit. Balance of payments surpluses on the current and 
capital accounts (of around 2% of GDP) since mid-2013 have provided for a reduction of 
over 10 pp in the net debit position from its peak during the crisis. That said, the net debit 
position was still at 86.8% of GDP in 2017 Q2 (the latest available data). 
The pick-up in demand on the housing market continued, with the growth rate of house sales 
in double figures in the first half of 2017, spurred by the improved economic situation and low 
borrowing costs. At the same time, the supply of new housing also increased, albeit from still-
very-low levels (74,000 new housing approvals in the 12 months to July 2017, the latest 
available figures). Against this background, prices rose by 5.6% in Q2 compared with the 
same period a year earlier, according to INE’s average house price statistics, slightly up on the 
figure of 4.5% posted six months earlier. Price rises were greater in the main cities. However, 
at the aggregate level, although there has been a 16% increase from the lows in early 2014, 
current prices are, on average, still 27% below their 2007 peak. 
Overall, the financial macroeconomic situation of the different sectors in Spain has tended 
to improve as a result of the greater pace of activity and employment, and of the ongoing 
correction of the imbalances built up previously. In any event, the still-high debt of the 
general government sector and of the economy as a whole vis-à-vis the external sector are 
two significant factors of fragility of the Spanish economy in the face of potentially less 
positive developments than expected in future activity and ahead of a possible rise in 
borrowing costs. 
In the current circumstances, the risks to the macroeconomic outlook in Spain and to 
financial markets continue to stem partly from an international context in which certain 
geopolitical uncertainties, Brexit and the developments in some large advanced and non-
advanced economies are still liable to trigger adverse effects on the pace of the global 
recovery. Likewise, the notable calm and low risk premia on global financial markets 
might be reversed, perhaps sharply so, with potentially negative effects on global 
economic growth. 
Nonetheless, the main uncertainty at present relates to developments in the situation in 
Catalonia, which might affect confidence, risk perception and national economic agents’ 
consumption and investment decisions, as well as prompting a tightening of financing 
conditions, with potentially significant economic and financial effects (see Box 1.1). 
… as it did in the case
of general government
and the external sector, 
although their debt levels
are still high 
The recovery in housing 
market prices and volumes 
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to be a factor of vulnerability 
ahead of potential adverse 
shocks 
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BOX 1.1THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ARISING FROM POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA
In its macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2017-
2019), the Banco de España indicated, at the end of September, 
that the political tensions in Catalonia might potentially affect 
agents’ confidence and their spending decisions and financing 
conditions.1 These tensions might prompt a revision of economic 
agents’ consumption, investment and financing decisions, with 
potentially significant effects on economic growth and financial 
stability. 
Indeed, there are numerous channels through which higher 
uncertainty may affect economic activity. In the case of households, 
a loss of confidence about the future scenario may encourage 
them to assign a greater percentage of their income to 
precautionary saving, thereby reducing their consumption and 
postponing their decisions on consumer durables and house 
purchases. Similarly, against a background of high uncertainty, 
companies might delay undertaking new investment projects, 
given the greater complexity for the associated cost/benefit 
planning, and put back hiring decisions. These investment and 
consumption decisions may become extensive to both resident 
and non-resident agents, adversely affecting variables such as 
tourism and foreign investment. The evidence available shows 
that, in a setting of greater uncertainty, financial corporations tend 
1  See: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/AnalisisEconomico/Analisis
Economico/ProyeccionesMacroeconomicas/ficheros/be1703-proye.
pdf. The Banco de España will update and publish its macroeconomic 
projections in December in the joint exercise with the Eurosystem to be 
conducted in the final quarter of the year.
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HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS OF CHANGES IN SYNTHETIC INDICATOR 
OF UNCERTAINTY OVER ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In the baseline scenario it is assumed that uncertainty throughout the entire projection horizon holds at the level observed in 2017 Q3, i.e. it does not increase. In 
scenario 1 it is assumed that the level of uncertainty increases temporarily during 2017 Q4 and returns in 2018 Q1 to the 2017 Q3 level. This increase is calibrated 
on the basis of the statistical distribution of the uncertainty measures considered, which increase by a magnitude that is in the 90th percentile of each series (i.e. 
only 10% of the historical changes, at the level of each indicator, are higher than those assumed). In scenario 2 an increase in uncertainty in 2017 Q4 equivalent 
to that recorded in the historical episode marking the sharpest rise is assumed, under the assumption that following this initial shock the level of the uncertainty 
indicators diminishes in a linear fashion over the simulation horizon.
b The cumulative effect is calculated as the difference in the rates of change between 2019 and 2017 of scenario 1 (or 2) compared with the baseline scenario. 
Accordingly, the 2019 effect includes that corresponding to 2018.
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BOX 1.1THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ARISING FROM POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA (cont’d)
to restrict the extension of credit for specific investment projects 
by households and firms. On the financial markets, greater 
uncertainty may be accompanied by increases in the volatility of 
asset prices, along with higher risk premia, with the subsequent 
impact on the financing costs for the economy as a whole. 
To date, the effect of the political tensions in Catalonia have been 
visible especially on the financial markets, where, since early 
October, stock market volatility has increased somewhat. The 
Spanish stock market index has performed more unfavourably 
than that of the Euro Stoxx 50, in particular owing to the negative 
trend of bank share prices and, especially, those of institutions 
headquartered in Catalonia. Subsequent developments have 
tended to partially normalise the situation. Overall, whereas the 
Euro Stoxx 50 increased by 7% from end-August to 30 October, 
the Spanish stock exchange rose by 1.4%. On the sovereign debt 
markets volatility was lower, with the Spanish 10-year bond yield 
spread over the related German bond initially widening and that 
relative to the Italian benchmark narrowing, although in both cases 
to a minor extent, the widening of the spread over the German 
bond having subsequently been reversed, meaning that in late 
October it stood at similar levels to those observed before the rise 
in political tensions that began in September. Regarding the bonds 
issued by the Catalan autonomous community, their yield spread 
over Spanish Treasury bonds2 stands at similar levels to those as 
of end-August, around 320 basis points, meaning that the increase 
observed in early October has been reversed. In any event, the 
Catalan autonomous government has not issued long-term 
securities since October 2012; the central government has since 
then been covering the former’s financing needs in this segment 
with bilateral loans (under the autonomous liquidity funds 
arrangement). As a result, as of mid-2017 almost 70% of the 
Catalan autonomous community’s public debt was in State hands. 
The conjunctural information on economic activity in the present 
quarter in Catalonia and in Spain as a whole is still very scant. 
Indeed, the most up-to-date leading economic indicators available 
still refer essentially to the end of the previous quarter. 
In the medium term, the macroeconomic impact of the current 
situation of uncertainty will depend both on its intensity and its 
duration. To illustrate the possible order of magnitude of this 
impact, several hypothetical scenarios are put forward below, 
based on past episodes in which significant increases in 
uncertainty were observed. Specifically, these scenarios 
incorporate different assumptions about the increase in and the 
duration of uncertainty. In this connection, use is made of a range 
of measures approximating the level and the change in the degree 
of uncertainty in the Spanish economy, and which include 
information from a broad set of indicators relating to the financial 
markets and to the situation of and outlook for the economy, and 
also on economic policies and on the country’s political situation.3 
The information is drawn together in three synthetic indicators, 
which are used in turn to calibrate the hypothetical scenarios of a 
change in uncertainty and to estimate its potential impact on 
economic activity through the use of statistical models.4
The simulations performed depart from a baseline scenario in which 
it is assumed that uncertainty, in the absence of the recent political 
episodes in Catalonia, would have held at the levels observed in 2017 
Q3 (see Charts A, B and C). Taking this baseline scenario as a 
reference, two alternative scenarios are considered. In the first, it is 
assumed that the level of aggregate risk increases temporarily during 
2017 Q4 and returns in 2018 Q1 to the baseline scenario level. This 
temporary increase is calibrated on the basis of the statistical 
distribution of the uncertainty measures considered, which it is 
assumed will increase in 2017 Q4 by a magnitude that is situated in 
the 90th percentile of each series (i.e. only 10% of the historical 
changes, at the level of each indicator, are greater than those 
assumed) (green line in Charts A, B and C). In the second scenario a 
more severe and prolonged risk is simulated, consisting of assuming 
an increase in the indicators in 2017 Q4 equivalent to that recorded in 
the preceding historical episode where the rise was sharpest, also at 
the level of each indicator (red line in Charts A, B and C). Specifically, 
for the uncertainty measures based on financial market indicators 
and on those relating to the situation and future course of economic 
activity, this means replicating in 2017 Q4 the increases posted by the 
measures during the initial stages of the recent global financial crisis. 
In the case of the uncertainty measure in respect of economic policies 
and the political situation, the initial shock simulated is equivalent to 
the increase recorded by this indicator in 2012 Q2, which marked the 
launch of the programme for the recapitalisation and restructuring of 
the banking sector signed by the Spanish Government and the 
European authorities. After this initial shock, it is assumed that the 
level of the indicators converges in a linear fashion on the baseline 
scenario over the horizon of the simulation. 
Chart D summarises GDP developments in the two foregoing 
hypothetical scenarios, compared with that which would be 
observed in the baseline scenario, over the next two years. In the 
first scenario (of temporary and bounded heightening of 
uncertainty), the cumulative loss in GDP to end-2019 would be 0.3 
pp, essentially reflecting lower growth in the remainder of this year 
2  This spread has been calculated as the average Asset Swap Spread 
(ASS) of all Catalan autonomous community bonds in circulation with a 
residual maturity of over one year, less the average ASS of Treasury-
issued bonds.
3  See Gil, María, Pérez, Javier J. and Urtasun, Alberto (2017), “Macroeconomic 
uncertainty: measurement and impact on the Spanish economy”, Analytical 
Articles, Banco de España, 2 February
4  The models are those used in the article mentioned in footnote 3. They 
are SVAR-type models, in which the uncertainty measured by the 
synthetic indicators of financial markets, of economic policy disagreement 
and uncertainty, real GDP, the Spanish sovereign debt spread over the 
German bond and a price index are included as endogenous variables, 
and the volatility of the Euro Stoxx 50, the Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index for the EU as a whole and a synthetic indicator of European 
uncertainty (calculated in a similar way to the synthetic indices for Spain) 
as exogenous variables.
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BOX 1.1THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY ARISING FROM POLITICAL TENSIONS IN CATALONIA (cont’d)
and the start of the following year. In the most severe and 
prolonged scenario of tensions, GDP would fall in cumulative 
terms by somewhat more than 2.5 pp between end-2017 and 
2019. This latter scenario would entail a reduction of almost 60% 
of the growth considered in the baseline scenario for the Spanish 
economy as a whole and a recession in the Catalan economy for 
much of the horizon analysed, reflecting the fact that the 
uncertainty shock considered in the previous years would affect 
this autonomous community more sharply. 
These estimations should be viewed with caution and interpreted 
as merely illustrative and provisional, given that they depend on 
the assumptions used when constructing the different scenarios, 
and on the use of a specific statistical tool. In any event, they serve 
to evidence the significant economic risks and costs of the 
situation caused by the independence initiatives in Catalonia. A 
prompt return to normal could mitigate the incidence of the risks 
for the economy analysed in this box. Indeed, the information 
relating to the days leading up to the publication of this FSR 
indicates a certain moderation in the degree of tension implicit in 
financial asset prices, coinciding with the adoption, on 27 October, 
by the Senate in plenary session of the Resolution authorising the 
application of certain measures in relation to the Catalan 
government under Article 155 of the Constitution.  
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2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
This chapter analyses in detail the situation of Spanish deposit institutions and the risks 
they face in the conduct of their business. In 2017 H1 the consolidated total assets of 
Spanish deposit institutions decreased by 2.8% year-on-year, due mainly to the behaviour 
of business in Spain, which continued to decline, albeit at a more moderate pace. Credit 
to the resident private sector in Spain contracted by 3.2% with respect to the same month 
of the previous year, and non-performing loans decreased by 13.1%, making for a 
cumulative fall of 45.8% since December 2013. As a result, the non-performing loans ratio 
of the resident private sector in Spain decreased to 8.6% in July 2017, down 0.9 pp from 
a year earlier. 
In the first six months of 2017, institutions as a whole posted more than €3,800 million of 
consolidated losses attributable to the parent. Such a negative performance resulted from 
the more than €12 billion of losses posted by Banco Popular Español after it was resolved 
by the SRB in June. Had it not been for this, Spanish deposit institutions would have recorded 
profits of more than €8.9 billion in the first half of this year. In terms of solvency, the CET1 
ratio decreased slightly to 11.9% at June 2017 largely for the reason stated above.
International exposure
The consolidated total assets of Spanish deposit institutions, which include both business 
in Spain and that conducted abroad through subsidiaries and branches, stood at €3,569 
billion in June 2017 (see Annex 1), down 2.8% from a year earlier. This decrease resulted 
from the behaviour of business both in Spain and abroad, the latter being influenced by the 
appreciation of the euro against the main currencies of the countries in which Spanish 
institutions carry on their international business. The total financial assets of business in 
Spain decreased by 4.4% in June 2017 compared with the same month of the previous 
year, while the total financial assets of business abroad decreased by 0.8% (see Chart 2.1). 
Thus the share of financial assets abroad in consolidated total assets increased to 44.9% 
in June 2017, illustrating the diversification of the Spanish banking system. 
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1 CREDIT RISK
In June 2017 total assets 
decreased by 2.8% year-on-
year due to the lower activity 
both in Spain (–4.4%) and 
abroad (–0.8%)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a? ??????????????????????? ?? ???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????????? ????? ????? ????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????
0
6
12
18
24
30
36
42
48
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Jun-13 Jun-14 Jun-15 Jun-16 Jun-17
 BUSINESS IN SPAIN  BUSINESS ABROAD % BUSINESS ABROAD (right-hand scale)
€?n %
INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE. FINANCIAL ASSETS (a)
Deposit institutions
CHART 2.1
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2017
Chart 2.2.A shows the geographical breakdown of the credit portfolio of banks in their 
business abroad. It can be seen in the chart that these exposures are concentrated mainly in 
Europe and most notably in the United Kingdom, which accounts for 28.5% of total exposures, 
in the United States (14.9% of the total) and in Latin America (23%). The breakdown by type 
of borrower (see Chart 2.2.B) differs significantly across countries. Thus, whereas in the 
United Kingdom around 70% of lending is to households, in the rest of Europe, the United 
States and Latin America the proportions of lending to non-financial corporations and to 
households are more even, with the percentages ranging from 30% to 40%. 
Between June 2016 and June 2017 the financial assets of Spanish banks in their business 
abroad were significantly affected by the behaviour of the euro exchange rate. In particular, 
Chart 2.3 shows that the appreciation of the euro against the pound sterling (6.4%) helped 
to explain the decrease of 2.6% in the volume of loans in the United Kingdom. Similarly, 
the decrease of 6.9% in loans in the United States was accompanied by a 2.8% appreciation 
of the euro against the dollar. Also in Brazil and Turkey the appreciation of the euro against 
the Brazilian real and the Turkish lira (4.7% and 25.2% respectively) contributed to 
explaining the adverse trend of loans in these countries, which contracted at 1% and 
4.2%, respectively, after converting their value to euro. In Mexico the volume of loans 
increased notably, with a rise of 11.4% against a background of slight depreciation of 
0.2% of the euro against the Mexican peso.
In any event, it should be noted that the activity of Spanish deposit institutions abroad is 
conducted through subsidiaries under financial independence criteria. Furthermore, as 
shown in Chart 2.4.A, these activities take place mainly in the local currency of the 
countries in which they are located. In particular, in June 2017 83.8% of the financial 
assets abroad were denominated in the local currency of the countries in which these 
assets were located. By country, the activities located in the United States (94%), Brazil 
(97%) and, on average, the euro area countries (95%) exhibited a higher proportion of 
denomination in local currency. In the United Kingdom, Mexico and Chile, the activities in 
local currency represented around 80% of total financial assets. Finally, in Turkey the share 
of business denominated in Turkish lira accounted for 60% of the financial assets of 
Spanish banks in this country (see Chart 2.4.B).
By country, the most notable 
exposures are to the United 
Kingdom, the United States 
and Latin America, although 
the distribution by type of 
borrower differs across 
countries
The fall in lending abroad was 
significantly influenced by the 
behaviour of exchange rates 
(widespread appreciation of 
the euro)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Non-performing assets
Consolidated non-performing assets decreased further in 2017 H1, continuing the sustained 
decline at banks in the last few years. The total volume of non-performing assets in June 2017 
stood at €138 billion, down 10% from a year earlier. In June 2017 non-performing assets thus 
made up 3.9% of banks’ consolidated total assets, compared with 4.2% in June 2016.
The ongoing decrease in non-performing assets allowed the total non-performing assets 
ratio of banks as a whole to be trimmed to 4.5% in June 2017, down 0.5 pp from the ratio 
in June 2016 (5%). The non-performing loans ratio of credit to the private sector dropped 
to 6.4% in June 2017, compared with 7.1% a year earlier, despite a fall-off of 0.7% in these 
loans in the period. 
The positive performance of consolidated non-performing loans in recent years has been 
favoured by the trend of Spanish deposit institutions’ lending abroad. Chart 2.5.A shows 
the behaviour between June 2015 and June 2017 of the non-performing loans ratio in the 
main countries in which Spanish banks conduct business abroad. As can be seen in the 
chart, the non-performing loans ratio generally decreased, except for slight increases in 
business in the United States and Turkey, where the ratios increased by 0.1 pp but 
Consolidated non-performing 
assets decreased by 10% 
year-on-year
The total non-performing 
assets ratio decreased by 
0.5 pp to 4.5% in June 2017
The non-performing loans 
ratios decreased across 
the board
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a A positive (negative) value in the growth rate implies an appreciation (depreciation) of the euro against the foreign currency.
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remained at very low levels. Most notable in the other countries were the decreases of 
around 0.7 pp in the ratios in Latin America and in most European countries.
On data from the European Banking Authority (EBA, see Chart 2.5.B), in June 2017 the 
non-performing loans ratio in Spain was slightly above the European average (4.5%). The 
firming of the economic recovery in the EU noted in Section 1.3 meant that in practically 
all EU countries the non-performing loans ratio decreased with respect to the previous 
year, with an average change of 1 pp. The dispersion across countries remains high, with 
ratios ranging between 46.5% in Greece and 1.1% in Luxembourg, although, since the 
ratios of the countries with higher non-performing levels have decreased the most, this 
dispersion is beginning to shrink. 
The database of consolidated information on European banks published by the European 
Central Bank (ECB on a quarterly basis1 allows the distribution of the volume of non-
performing loans across countries to be analysed. Chart A of Box 2.2 shows that Italy is 
clearly at the head of the EU with nearly €300 billion of non-performing loans in March 
2017. Italy is followed by France (€150 billion) and Spain (€136 billion). The countries 
which have most reduced their volume of non-performing loans since December 2014 
are Spain, with a decrease of around €47 billion, and Ireland, with a decrease of €40 
1  See: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/supervisory_prudential_statistics/consolidated_banking_data/html/ index.en.html
The non-performing loans 
ratio of Spanish banks is 
slightly higher than the 
European average...
... both for non-financial 
corporations and households
%
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a NPL ratio in Greece and Cyprus is 46.5% and 43%, respectively.
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billion. In March 2017 the NPL ratio for lending to non-financial corporations by European 
banks at consolidated level (Chart 2.6) was 9.7%, slightly lower than that for Spanish 
banks (10.3%), with a high dispersion across jurisdictions. In the case of household 
loans, the non-performing loans ratio of Spanish banks is in line with the European 
average (4.6%).
Domestic exposure
In June 2017 credit to the resident private sector, analysed through the individual balance 
sheets of banks in their business in Spain, decreased by 3.2% with respect to the same 
month a year earlier (see Chart 2.7). This fall is appreciably lower than that in June 2016 
(4.5%), and, accordingly, the trend in recent years towards normalisation of the rates of 
change of credit continues.
In business in Spain, lending 
to the resident private sector 
continued falling in June, 
albeit at less negative rates 
than in 2016
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Chart 2.7 shows that the less negative values of rates of change of credit to the resident 
private sector were widespread across institutional and economic sectors. Credit to non-
financial corporations for purposes other than construction and real estate activities 
remained at the near-zero growth rates prevailing since mid-2015 due, among other 
reasons, to the existence of financing sources other than bank loans for large firms, such 
as debt issuance. Regarding construction and real estate activities, the decrease in the 
rate of change of credit moderated to –8.1% in June 2017, compared with a more negative 
rate a year earlier (–9.7%). Overall, credit to non-financial firms decreased by 2.9% 
between June 2016 and June 2017.
Household credit decreased by 1.8% in the past year, although credit for house purchase 
and rehabilitation behaved dissimilarly to that for other purposes. The former decreased 
by 2.8% in June 2017, a rate of fall somewhat smaller than that in June 2016 (–3.5%). 
However, credit for other purposes (basically consumption) grew by 3% in the past 12 
months, i.e. more strongly than in June 2016 (1.7%).
The easing in rates of change 
was widespread across 
institutional and economic 
sectors
In household lending, the 
behaviour of house purchase 
credit and that for other 
purposes was uneven, the 
latter having grown in the 
preceding 12 months
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Loans originated in new transactions for the system between January and August of each year. They do not include renewals, forbearance nor subrogations. Nor 
do they include increases in principal drawn down in revolving loans, commercial credit, capped loans, credit cards and overdrafts relating to exposures originated 
in previous months.
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In the Overview of this FSR, the low profitability of banks, against 
a background of still-declining credit volume and of a decreasing, 
but high, level of non-productive assets, is identified as a risk 
factor of the Spanish financial system. This Box analyses in more 
detail the relationship between bank activity and various measures 
of the profitability and solvency of significant institutions and the 
main less significant institutions in Spain (including all the 
cooperative sector). The common equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio, the 
NPL ratio of credit to the resident private sector in Spain and the 
ROE are stated for June 2016 and the change in credit to the 
resident private sector in Spain is expressed in year-on-year 
terms between June 2016 and June 2017. This dataset forms the 
basis of the analysis conducted to measure whether there is a 
relationship between the rate of change of credit and bank 
profitability, asset quality and solvency.
For each variable of interest, for example ROE, the sample of 
banks is divided into four groups on the basis of the 25th, 50th 
and 75th percentiles of this variable in order to study the 
distribution of credit growth within each group. Also, a scatter 
chart is used to observe the correlation between the variable of 
interest and the change in credit.
Our analysis shows a clearly negative relationship between credit 
quality in June 2016, as measured by the NPL ratio, and year-on-
year changes in credit, for which variable the distributions become 
progressively more adverse as the NPL ratio of the bank group 
examined worsens. Lower NPLs are thus associated with higher 
credit growth. For the profitability (ROE) and solvency (CET1 ratio) 
variables, a positive relationship with the change in credit is 
observed, but the analysis by group shows that the differences 
are concentrated at the extremes. That is to say, only banks with 
a low ROE (or a high CET1 ratio) clearly reduce (or increase) their 
lending differentially with respect to the other bank groups.
1. ROE and change in credit
Chart A shows how banks with lower profitability in June 2016 
(ROE below 3.5%) have a more adverse credit change distribution 
(higher frequency of banks with negative or low growth), with a 
median (–0.8%), 10th percentile (–17%) and 90th percentile (5.5%) 
clearly below the value of these metrics in the other groups. The 
differences in credit change distribution between bank groups 
largely disappear in groups with a ROE above 3.5%. Chart B shows 
the positive relation between ROE and credit growth.
2. NPL ratio and change in credit
Chart C shows how the credit change distribution becomes clearly 
more adverse with increasing NPL ratio (NPL ratio below 6% in the 
BOX 2.1CHANGE IN CREDIT: RELATIONSHIP TO PROFITABILITY, NPLs AND SOLVENCY
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Significantly, analysis by firm size (see Chart 2.8.A) showed an increase of 5.4% year-on-
year in credit to SMEs (up €13 billion on June 2016). This increase was attributable to the 
smaller-size firms: microfirms (increase of 12.6% year-on-year) and small companies (up 
9.7%). For their part, medium-sized firms showed a year-on-year decrease in credit of 
4.9% in June 2017. This increase in credit to SMEs contrasts with the decrease of €28 
billion in credit to larger-size firms (–12% year-on-year) with direct access to the capital 
market. Owing to these events, the weight of SMEs in total credit to non-financial 
corporations increased in the past year, rising from 46.5% of the total in June 2016 to 
50.6% in June 2017. Box 2.1 analyses the relationship between credit growth and banks’ 
profitability, NPLs and solvency.
New loans granted between January and August 2017 by deposit institutions in their 
business in Spain stood at €190 billion, slightly higher than in the same months of 2015 
and 2016. This increase is mainly due to the growth in new lending to households in 2017 
with respect to previous years (see Chart 2.8.B).
The approval rate of loans requested by non-financial corporations from banks with which 
they are not currently operating was nearly 32% in the first half of 2017, down 2 pp from 
that in the same period of 2016 (see Chart 2.8.C). The slight downward trend seen since 
mid-2015 thus continues. These rates remain far removed from those seen in the years 
before the crisis, when they were around 47%, and above the lowest level (30%) of the 
historical time series which occurred between 2008 and 2013. This behaviour took place 
against a background marked by an increase of 2% in the number of loan applications 
between the first half of 2017 and the same period of 2016.
Credit to SMEs rose by 5.4%, 
due particularly to that to 
smaller firms
The loan approval rate 
was down by 2 pp from the 
previous year, continuing 
the slight downward trend
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BOX 2.1CHANGE IN CREDIT: RELATIONSHIP TO PROFITABILITY, NPLs AND SOLVENCY (cont’d)
distribution than the other groups, with less marked negative 
changes in the bottom percentiles and higher upward growth in 
the top percentiles. By contrast, there is no clear pattern of change 
in the credit change distribution as a function of the level of the 
CET1 ratio in bank groups with a ratio below 17%. In particular, the 
bank group with the lowest CET1 ratio (between 10% and 12%) 
does not have a more adverse distribution than groups with 
solvency ratios between 12% and 17%. Chart F shows that, 
despite this relatively flat pattern when banks are classified into 
solvency groups, the average relationship between CET1 ratio and 
credit growth is positive.
bottom group and above 10% in the top group), with a decreasing 
pattern shown by both the median and the extreme percentiles. At 
banks with an NPL ratio above 10%, the median of the change in credit 
is –3.2%, while the other groups have positive medians as well as much 
less negative values in the 10th and 25th percentiles. The negative 
correlation between these two variables is clearly apparent in Chart D.
3. CET1 ratio and change in credit
Chart E shows that banks in the group with the highest CET1 
ratios (above 17%) have a clearly more favourable credit change 
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Interest rates on new loans (see Chart 2.8.D) continued on the stabilising path seen in 
2016, especially in the case of households, both in house purchase loans and in those for 
other purposes. Also steadier were the interest rates on loans above €1 million to firms, 
while those on loans below this amount continued the slight decline apparent in recent 
years, albeit more moderately.
Troubled assets
Spain’s favourable economic performance in the past year allowed a further decrease in 
non-performing loans between June 2016 and June 2017 (see Chart 2.9.A). This decrease, 
at €15.4 billion in absolute terms, was in line with those seen in the last few years. From 
the peak amount of non-performing loans in December 2013, the decrease is now €86.7 
billion. In percentage terms, the decrease in the past year has been 13.1%, while the 
cumulative decrease since December 2013 is 45.8%. However, the decrease in the past 
year is smaller than that recorded a year earlier (18.2% in June 2016). If the economy 
maintains the pattern of growth seen in recent years with an evident recovery in the 
employment level, and active management continues through open-market sales – and 
Interest rates on new loans 
continued on the stabilising 
path seen in 2016
Non-performing loans 
continued to decrease in the 
past year, at a year-on-year 
rate of 13.1%, showing 
a cumulative fall of 45.8% 
since December 2013
NPLs. RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR
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others already announced but still in the process of execution – by banks of their non-
productive assets, non-performing loans will conceivably decrease further in the business 
in Spain of deposit institutions. Box 2.2 contains a more in-depth time analysis of non-
performing loans. 
By institutional sector, non-performing loans decreased in lending to non-financial 
corporations (–17.3%), while they increased slightly in household lending (1%) due to NPL 
behaviour in consumer credit. In both cases the rates of change of non-performing loans 
are smaller than 12 months earlier. The year-on-year decrease in non-performing loans to 
households was 13% in June 2016, while that in non-performing loans to non-financial 
corporations was 20.1%. 
Analysis by activity (see Chart 2.9.C) shows that non-performing loans to non-financial 
corporations decreased both in lending for construction and real estate activities (–23.6% 
year-on-year in June 2017) and in lending to other sectors (decrease of 9.8%). In loans for 
construction and real estate activities, the decrease was more marked than in June 2016 
also in year-on-year terms. In household lending, the behaviour of house purchase NPLs 
deferred markedly from that of consumer NPLs. The former continued their downward 
course, falling by 1.9% year-on-year in June 2017, while consumer NPLs grew with respect 
to the same month of the previous year (up by 8.5%). This type of credit is one of the most 
profitable business segments (see Chart 2.8.D) and that which grew most in year-on-year 
terms (see Chart 2.7). The persistently low profitability faced by banks may have induced 
them to seek higher profits recently at the cost of running higher risks. The upsurge in non-
performing loans of banks generally (see Chart 2.9.B) may be a sign of this higher risk. 
Attention will have to be paid to these developments in the coming months.
Charts 2.10.A and 2.10.B show, respectively, the movements explaining the behaviour of 
non-performing loans between December 2015 and June 2016 and between December 
2016 and June 2017. In both cases non-performing loans decreased between the start 
and the end of the period analysed. However, compared with what occurred in the first six 
months of 2016, the decrease in non-performing loans in the latter half-year was based 
more on loan recoveries, since new non-performing loans increased. 
In the past year troubled 
assets decreased at 
non-financial corporations, 
but increased slightly in 
households
In corporates, the decrease 
was across all sectors, 
while in households they 
decreased in house purchase 
loans but increased in other 
credit
Inflows into and recoveries 
of non-performing loans 
increased with respect to 
the previous year
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total NPLs at the beginning of the period. NPLs recovered include both non-performing 
loans that become performing again, foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties.
FLOW OF RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR NPLs
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BOX 2.2NON-PERFORMING LOANS: ECONOMIC SETTING, PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT
As noted at the beginning of this FSR, non-productive assets on 
banks’ balance sheets put pressure on their income statements. 
The more information there is on these assets, the easier it will be 
to formulate measures to minimise their impact on the financial 
position of banks.
The current scenario in Europe highlights their importance. On 
consolidated data as at March 2017, the total volume of NPLs in 
the EU amounted to somewhat more than €1 trillion, practically 
the value of the Spanish GDP, or 7% of the EU GDP.
Chart A shows the volume of NPLs in the countries forming part of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and in the United 
Kingdom. Most notable here is the Italian banking system, which 
accounts for around €300 billion, followed by the major European 
banking systems in terms of size.
Clearly, banking system size is a determining factor when NPLs 
are classified in absolute terms. However, when these NPLs are 
expressed in relative terms, i.e. as a proportion of total exposure, 
the situation changes because size is no longer the variable 
determining the order in the classification.
Chart 2.5.B shows that, at consolidated level, the NPL ratio of the 
Spanish banking system is only slightly higher than the EU average.
Having placed the problem in its context and shown that it affects 
the whole of the European banking system, we now look at some 
of its main features, focusing particularly on Spain. For this 
purpose we use domestic NPL data on loans to the resident 
private sector.
Chart B of the Overview shows the behaviour of NPLs over more 
than three decades for Spanish deposit institutions as a whole, 
both in absolute terms (billions of euro) and in relative terms 
through the NPL ratio.
Evidently the recent financial crisis constituted a thereto unknown 
situation for the Spanish banking system. The volume of NPLs on 
the balance sheet of deposit institutions climbed to almost ten 
times the previous record high (1993 crisis). Such a large volume 
of NPLs also caused extremely high increases, in comparative 
terms, in NPL ratios. The time dimension of total NPLs and of the 
NPL ratio, shown here for domestic exposures, serves to set the 
severity of the recent crisis in its context.
Further insight into the recovery capacity shown by the Spanish 
banking system is gained from comparing the decrease in the volume 
of NPLs from the peak reached in the recent crisis with that in 1993.
That is to say, if the nominal fall in the volume of NPLs from the 
2013 peak to December 2016 (three years) is compared with that 
which took place in 1993 after the same lapse of time (i.e. taking 
NPL volume in December 1996), the two adjustments are seen to 
coincide. In other words, three years (36 months) after the 
December 2013 peak, the fall in the volume of NPLs (somewhat 
more than 40%) coincides with that which took place in the three 
years following the 1993 crisis (see Chart B).
A similar time analysis of the NPL ratio shows that the adjustment 
after the 1993 crisis (three years later) is larger than that which 
occurred after the 2013 peak. The reason is the behaviour of the 
denominator of the ratio (the volume of exposures). The continuous 
fall in the total volume of credit, which still persists, prevented the 
NPL ratio in the recent crisis from reaching the level of adjustment 
seen in the 1993 crisis (Chart C). It thus seems obvious that recovery 
in credit growth would help to resolve the NPL problem more rapidly.
In any event, what is clear after the two crises is the high correlation 
between the business cycle and the build-up of NPLs (Chart D). If 
the business cycle continues to improve, it can be expected that, 
given the negative correlation with the amount of NPLs, the volume 
of NPLs will continue to decrease.
SOURCES: European Central Bank and Banco de España.
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Some possible solutions to the NPL problem at European level 
include: the creation of government and/or privately owned asset 
management companies to optimise the management of these assets 
(e.g. Sareb in Spain); fostering and facilitating the functioning of NPL 
secondary markets; reducing possible legal obstacles to the creation 
of these markets and the sale of NPLs on them; and starting up NPL 
valuation and management services to help optimise NPL treatment.
In any event, we should not forget that the best policy to follow is one 
which entails not having to apply any of the aforementioned measures. 
Therefore, the approach prevailing in the appropriate management of 
bank credit risk should be of a preventive nature, through the 
implementation of prudent loan valuation policies and the non-
relaxation of credit standards. Credit risk mitigators (collateral) and the 
related appropriate collateral valuation, along with prospective 
measures (e.g. stress tests) and retrospective measures (review of 
credit standards), should form part of and complete the battery of 
policy measures to be taken to prevent the NPL problem. The historical 
evidence shows that crises are cyclical episodes associated with the 
growth of NPLs, which are an extremely costly consequence of them.
Having identified the problem, as well as its amount and its evident 
relationship with economic activity, we now examine its treatment. 
The key is the recognition of the associated loss, which is done 
through asset impairment, i.e. by recording provisions.
An appropriate level of provisions is crucial for the proper treatment 
of NPLs. In June 2017 the level of coverage of NPLs in the domestic 
exposures of Spanish deposit institutions was 46%, being 55% in 
corporate loans and 30% in household loans (Chart E).
However, the analysis cannot be considered complete if the 
examination of provisioning coverage is not accompanied by a 
consideration of loan collateral. Thus, if the value of collateral is 
added to the volume of provisions, the average coverage reaches 
89%, and practically 100% in mortgage loans (Chart F).
Even when impairment, i.e. the level of provisions, is adequate, it 
may be considered, as is currently so in the EU, that the level of 
NPLs is so high that alternative solutions have to be explored to 
reduce the existing NPL levels.
NON-PERFORMING LOANS: ECONOMIC SETTING, PROBLEMS AND TREATMENT (cont’d) BOX 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The non-performing loans ratio of the resident private sector in business in Spain continued 
the trend shown in the last few years and decreased to 8.6% in July 2017, a fall of 0.9 pp 
in the ratio in the past 12 months (see Chart 2.11.A). This was because non-performing 
loans (numerator of the ratio) decreased more sharply than loans (denominator of the ratio) 
in year-on-year terms. However, the slower pace of the fall in non-performing loans in 
recent quarters meant that the non-performing loans ratio also fell more slowly year-on-
year compared with previous periods (see Chart 2.11.B).
The non-performing loans 
ratio decreased further to 
8.6% in July 2017
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By institutional sector (see Chart 2.11.C), the NPL ratio increased slightly in household 
lending, from 5.2% in June 2016 to 5.4% in June 2017, interrupting the downward trend 
seen in recent quarters since the peak of March 2014. In non-financial corporations the 
ratio decreased significantly from 15.8% in June 2016 to 13.4% a year later (down 2.4 pp). 
In this latter case the trend seen in recent years continued.
In household lending, the NPL ratio of loans for purposes other than house purchase 
increased in the past year to 9.2% (8.7% in June 2016), in line with the higher risk and 
profitability of these transactions. In any event, Chart 2.11.C shows that this ratio 
peaked in March this year. The NPL ratio of house purchase lending held steady in the 
past year at around 4.5%. The NPL ratio of lending to non-financial corporations 
decreased both in construction and real estate activities (from 27.6% in June 2016 to 
23% in June 2017) and in the other sectors of activity (9.4% in June 2017 compared 
with 10.4% a year earlier). 
Analysis by firm size (see Chart 2.11.D) shows that in June 2017 the smallest firms 
(microfirms) had the highest NPL ratio (23%), followed by small companies (17.1%) and 
medium-sized firms (16%). SMEs as a whole had an NPL ratio of 18.9%, it having 
decreased in the past year by 2 pp from 20.9% in June 2016. Large firms had a lower NPL 
ratio (7.7 % in June 2017). The chart illustrates the notable decrease in the NPL ratio by 
firm size in recent years.
Forborne loans to the private sector by Spanish banks as a whole at consolidated level 
amounted to €138.9 billion in June 2017, down 29.5% from a year earlier. According to 
individual financial statements, which include only the activity of banks operating in 
Spain, the volume of forborne loans to the private sector stood at €103.1 billion, down 
36% year-on-year. 
The systemic risk indicator (SRI), which measures synthetically the level of stress in the 
financial markets,2 has remained low since the publication of the previous FSR, reflecting 
the ongoing containment of tensions in the financial markets since the second half of 
2016. However, in October its level has increased as a result of the political uncertainty 
in Catalonia. In any event, the SRI is still at levels lower than those recorded after Brexit 
or early-2016 turmoil (see Chart 2.12), and far from the levels reached in the 2011-2012 
crisis. The escalation of political tensions may negatively affect this index, which captures 
investor sentiment and confidence in the Spanish financial markets.
The contribution of Spanish banks to the systemic risk of the euro area as a whole is 
quantified by means of a model known as CoVaR. Following episodes of systemic alert 
recorded during the crisis, the average CoVaR of Spanish banks has since remained at 
much lower levels. The latest data show that the 5th percentile of the CoVaR of European 
banks has increased, indicating a fall in the contribution to systemic risk from the banks 
which had shown themselves to be most systemic. This improvement is also seen in the 
average for Spanish banks. However, at the same time there is a closer proximity to the 5th 
percentile. This indicates that the contribution to systemic risk from Spanish banks has 
increased in relative terms with respect to the rest of the European system, although in 
absolute terms its contribution has decreased.
Since the previous FSR, euro area interbank market activity has continued to weaken. 
2  See Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR for an explanation of its construction and interpretation.
The ratio increased slightly 
in households and decreased 
in non-financial corporations
In households the NPL ratio 
of lending for house purchase 
held steady and that of 
lending for other purposes 
increased, while in corporate 
lending there was an across-
the-board decrease
In the past year forborne 
loans decreased by 29.5% 
at consolidated level and by 
36% in business in Spain
2.1.2 SYSTEMIC RISK
The SRI remains low, 
although it has increased 
in October as a result of the 
political uncertainty in 
Catalonia
2.1.3 FUNDING RISK
Interbank market activity 
remained very low...
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Chart 2.13.A shows EONIA trading volume, which remained very low and reached an all-
time low at the beginning of June. The performance of the Spanish interbank market was 
similar, with very small trading volumes in both the collateralised and the non-collateralised 
segments and a progressively less significant role of the latter, which in 2017 Q3 only 
represented 2% of total trading.
This limited activity on the interbank markets continues to be largely due to the excess 
liquidity resulting from the Eurosystem’s extensive monetary policy measures via various 
asset purchase and refinancing programmes (see Chart 2.13.B), including the four targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO II) executed between June 2016 and March 
2017. Chart 2.13.C shows the outstanding amount provided through ECB tenders, both 
for the Eurosystem as a whole and for banks resident in Spain. It shows that European, 
and particularly Spanish, credit institutions have continued to have considerable recourse 
to Eurosystem funds and have even increased the funding obtained via tenders by 
submitting bids in TLTRO II operations, especially the last one, the allotment for which was 
at the end of March. Since then, gross recourse has remained practically constant both in 
the Eurosystem as a whole and in Spain. 
...largely due to the extensive 
Eurosystem monetary policy 
measures
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comprises a total of 37 listed Spanish and euro area institutions.
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Consequently, the loan to Spanish banks as a percentage of the Eurosystem total has 
scarcely changed since the publication of the previous FSR. Specifically, the share of 
funds allotted in tenders to banks resident in Spain averaged 22.2% in September 2017. 
However, this share becomes less and less representative as the Eurosystem purchase 
programme proceeds, because the relative importance of refinancing operations is 
decreasing. Indeed, the liquidity provided by this last mechanism, nearly €800 billion, 
accounted at October for a little more than one-third of the amount provided by the 
Eurosystem under the purchase programme. 
With regard to longer-term funding, Spanish deposit institutions stepped up their issuance 
activity in the first three quarters of 2017 compared with the same period of 2016 (see 
Chart 2.13.D). Particularly notable was the growth in issuance of instruments capable of 
absorbing losses and those eligible for solvency purposes, whether as Tier 1 or Tier 2 
capital. Senior debt issuance also grew significantly, exceeding €15 billion in the year so 
far. Moreover, this year Spanish banks began to issue senior non-preferred debt which 
they can use to meet MREL requirements (for own funds and other eligible liabilities) set 
by the European resolution authorities. 
Banks stepped up their 
issuance activity in the first 
three quarters particularly the 
issuance of senior debt and 
debt capable of absorbing 
losses
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Some bondholders took losses following the resolution in June of 
this year of Banco Popular Español (BPE) and the resolution and 
winding up of two Italian banks, Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPV) 
and Veneto Banca (VB).1 This raises the question as to whether 
there has been a change in the market perception of the risk of 
debt and equity instruments issued by banks. This question is 
especially relevant for eligible loss-absorbing instruments in bank 
resolution processes. Drawing on market price data for financial 
instruments of a broad sample of banks, the extent of this possible 
change in perception is analysed.
Chart A depicts the performance of the EURO STOXX 600 European 
banking sector index and of the average secondary market spreads 
to benchmark mid-swaps for euro-denominated senior and 
subordinated bank debt. No signs of stress are observed around 
the resolution dates of BPE (7 June 2017), BPV or VB (both 23 June 
BOX 2.3EFFECTS OF BANK RESOLUTION ACTIONS IN THE EURO AREA ON THE MARKET OF ELIGIBLE INSTRUMENTS WITH 
LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY 
The future requirement that deposit institutions hold a minimum amount of MREL so they 
have sufficient funds to obviate government bail-outs in resolution situations, will oblige 
them to turn to the markets to obtain the required amounts. In view of the volume of issues 
which may eventually be needed, there is a risk that offerings of instruments will accumulate 
in a short space of time and that placement difficulties may arise, depending on the type 
of bank in question. Therefore, the tailoring of MREL policy to the various resolution tools 
available (bail-in, bank sale, bridge bank and sale of a portion of assets), the adaption of 
banks’ business models and the requirements schedules to be determined by the 
resolution authorities, will be important for managing these issues.
Covered bond insurance decreased considerably to stand below €3 billion. As regards its 
course over the year, issuances of all types of debt were higher in the first half of the year 
and decreased in the third quarter. Box 2.3 analyses how the market for eligible loss-
absorbing instruments was affected by the recent bank resolution actions in the euro area.
SOURCES: Datastream and Reuters.
a? ???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
b? ?????????? ????????????????? ? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????
c? ????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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1  Subordinated bondholders of all three banks, except for retail 
bondholders in the case of the Italian banks, lost all their investment as a 
consequence of resolution. According to the banks’ latest annual reports, 
at the 2016 close subordinated bonds amounted to €2 billion for BPE and 
to slightly more than €600 million for each of the two Italian banks.
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BOX 2.3EFFECTS OF BANK RESOLUTION ACTIONS IN THE EURO AREA ON THE MARKET OF ELIGIBLE INSTRUMENTS WITH 
LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY (cont’d)
fully bailed in and lost all their investment (with the exception of 
retail investors in the case of the Italian banks), part of the market 
could be expecting both kinds of instruments to receive similar 
treatment in future such episodes, meaning that the yield spread 
required of each market (larger in the AT1 market) could have 
narrowed.
In this respect, Chart B shows the interest rate spreads between 
T2 and AT1 instruments. Although the spreads widened in the 
week of the BPE resolution (higher yields required in the AT1 
market), in the days that followed they returned to their previous 
2017). Following the resolution of BPE there is hardly any change in 
either senior or subordinated bank debt yield spreads, or in the 
EURO STOXX 600 European banking sector index, while following 
the winding up of the two Italian banks there is even some positive 
movement in the spreads and in banking sector share prices.
In the case of subordinated debt, it is interesting to analyse whether 
or not there have been changes in perceived risk in their main 
segments, namely Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1) issues and issues 
of debt considered Tier 2 capital (T2) or similar2 which rank behind 
the former instruments in loss-absorbing processes (and have, 
therefore, lower risk). In view of the characteristics of the above-
mentioned resolution processes, in which junior bondholders were 2  Also includes Lower/Upper T2 issues.
SOURCE: Reuters.
a Change in price of the bonds expressed as a percentage of par value on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis displays the distribution in percentiles of the bond issues 
considered. The bonds with the largest drops in price are on the left-hand side of the distribution and those with the largest price increases on the right-hand side.
b The series represent the cumulative change since 9 June in the median price for each set of bonds, all euro-denominated. The stressed bonds series comprises 
the 5% of bank AT1 and T2 (or similar) bonds in the sample with the largest drops in price between 6 and 9 of June, after the resolution of BPE. The total bonds 
series relates to the set of all euro-denominated subordinated bonds issued by European banks.
c The series represent the cumulative change since 30 June in the median price for each subset of bonds, all euro-denominated. The stressed bonds series 
comprises the 5% of bank AT1 and T2 (or similar) bonds in the sample with the largest drops in price between 22 and 30, after the resolution of BPV and VB. 
The total bonds series relates to the set of all euro-denominated subordinated bonds issued by European banks.
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BOX 2.3EFFECTS OF BANK RESOLUTION ACTIONS IN THE EURO AREA ON THE MARKET OF ELIGIBLE INSTRUMENTS WITH 
LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY (cont’d)
surprise, since as in the case of BPE, junior bondholders at both 
banks, with the exception of retail bondholders, were fully bailed 
in and lost all their investment.
Several factors may have helped to mitigate the stress arising from 
the winding up of BPV and VB, and even to have driven up certain 
bonds. First, these banks’ bonds were already trading at a 
significant discount, so investors were anticipating a loss-
absorption scenario. Second, the decision to wind up the banks 
included the sale of part of their business to a third bank, Intesa 
Sanpaolo, with public funds committed by the Italian government. 
Third, in 2016 the Italian banking sector had injected capital into 
BPV and VB through the Atlante fund and it was exposed to losses 
at the banks. Although the winding up process means that the 
capital supplied by the fund is also subject to losses, it limits the 
uncertainty surrounding possible further capital contributions by 
the Italian banking sector. Moreover, on 4 July 2017, it was 
announced that State aid would be provided for the rescue of 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena.3 The presence of public funds in these 
processes sets them apart from the BPE resolution and could 
explain the more favourable response of some issues, especially 
the most stressed ones. However, this market response is possibly 
not taking into consideration other effects arising from the use of 
State aid, such as the impact on public finances, or other effects 
relating to links between the public and private sector.
levels. Spreads then narrowed gradually until August, when they 
widened again. This more recent behaviour seems to be consistent, 
at least in part, with the performance of bank shares in the same 
period, which rose up to August and then fell back again. Therefore, 
save at specific junctures, it seems there has been no change in 
perceived risk between the two kinds of issues.
The analysis of the resolution of BPE and of the winding up of BPV 
and VB is extended using granular data on individual issues to 
detect stress that is not visible in the indices that group together 
prices of multiple instruments. In this respect, Chart C depicts the 
distribution of the changes in price (expressed as a percentage of 
par value) of a broad sample of AT1 instruments and T2 or similar 
instruments in the week of the BPE resolution. Although few 
changes are observed in the centre of the distribution, the 
movements in the left tail are more pronounced, signalling an 
increase in the perceived risk of the debt of certain banks. This 
pattern may be in response to the unexpectedness of the 
resolution or the treatment received by junior bondholders, which 
may have aroused expectations of similar treatment by the 
European authorities for future resolutions. In any event, it should 
be noted that the price of the instruments hardest hit by the BPE 
resolution event have since recovered significantly (see Chart D).
The market performance following the winding up of BPV and VB 
is quite different. In this case, the distribution of the changes in 
price of these instruments immediately after the episode shows a 
sharp increase in some bond prices on the right tail of the 
distribution (see Chart E). In addition, and similarly to the situation 
following the BPE resolution, the bonds with the most negative 
response on those dates subsequently outperformed the sample 
as a whole (see Chart F). At first glance the market response may 
Regarding retail funding, consolidated private-sector deposits grew by 0.7% in June 2017 
compared with the same month of 2016 thanks to the favourable performance of deposits 
abroad, which increased by 2.4% in the period and offset the fall in total deposits in Spain 
(–1.1%). Thus the proportion of deposits abroad in the total increased slightly to 39.3% in 
June 2017 (see Chart 2.14). 
Notable in the analysis by country shown in Chart 2.15.A is the volume of deposits in the 
United Kingdom (28% of total deposits abroad), the United States (13.4%) and Latin 
America (22.6%). The distribution of deposits by counterparty (Chart 2.15.B) is significantly 
uneven across geographical areas. Thus, while in the European countries retail funding 
from households (share of 68.7% in the United Kingdom) dominates, in the United States 
and Latin America funding is more evenly spread across counterparties.
EBA’s Risk Dashboard has recently incorporated information on the capacity of the major 
European banks to cope with possible liquidity tensions as measured by the Liquidity 
Private-sector deposits grew 
by 0.7% at consolidated level 
thanks to an increase of 2.4% 
in the total volume of deposits 
abroad
The breakdown of deposits 
by type of counterparty differs 
across countries, the funding 
received from households 
being most noteworthy
The liquidity coverage ratio of 
Spanish banks was 152%...
3  On 4 July the European Commission (EC) approved the plan for a 
precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena, setting out the 
details, which include an injection of €3.9 billion by the Italian government, 
in addition to the mandatory conversion into equity of the bank’s junior 
bonds, for a sum of €4.3 billion. Previously, on 1 June, the EC announced 
that an agreement in principle had been reached in this respect.
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Coverage Ratio (LCR). This liquidity measure considers the liquid and high-quality assets 
held by banks to address the net outflows of cash which may occur in a severe stress 
scenario lasting 30 days. A ratio above 100% indicates that the bank has sufficient funds 
to cope with the cash outflows which may occur under the scenario in question. Chart 
2.16 shows that Spanish banks had an LCR of 152% in June 2017, in line with the European 
average (146%) and well above the temporary threshold of 80% set in 2017 and the 
minimum level of 100% which will be required from 2018. 
Retail deposits from households and non-financial corporations taken by deposit 
institutions in Spain increased by 2.7% in June 2017 with respect to the same month of 
the previous year. This rate is similar to that in June 2016 and to those seen since mid-
2015, when the deposits of households and non-financial corporations began to recover 
despite a downward trend in interest rates. Despite the low yield of deposits, the lack of 
higher yielding investment alternatives with the same risk profile allowed the deposits of 
household and non-financial corporations to hold steady, although with a moderately 
upward trend, in recent times (see Chart 2.17.A).
...in June 2017, in line with 
the European average and well 
above the required minimum 
threshold
Retail deposits in Spain 
increased by 2.7%...
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Owing to the aforementioned low yields on deposits by households and non-financial 
corporations, time deposits have decreased sharply in recent years, being replaced by 
sight deposits. This trend has also prevailed in the past 12 months. Thus, while time 
deposits decreased by 26.1% year-on-year in June 2017, sight deposits grew by 18.4% in 
same period. These rates of decrease and of increase were both higher than in the same 
month of the previous year (see Chart 2.17.B).
...while sight deposits 
continued to increase at the 
expense of time deposits due 
to their low yields...
SOURCE: European Banking Authority.
LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO. EUROPEAN COMPARISON. 
SSM countries and United Kingdom. June 2017
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The downward trend in lending and the recovery of resident private-sector deposits has 
allowed a significant ongoing decrease in the loan-deposit ratio in recent years, which has 
continued to be seen in the past 12 months. This ratio is near to half of its value in October 
2007, when the peak of the whole series was recorded (see Chart 2.17.C). 
The net assets of investment funds increased by €18.2 billion in the first eight months of 
2017, with a year-on-year rate of change of 12.6%. The total assets of investment funds 
reached €253.6 billion, driven mainly by net subscriptions, which contributed to the increase 
in total net assets of investment funds in all months of the year (see Chart 2.17.D). Yields 
also performed favourably in aggregate terms, although they progressively decreased after 
peaking in February and March 2017, even turning negative in June and August.
In the first six months of 2017, Spanish deposit institutions as a whole posted €3,878 
million of consolidated losses attributable to the parent. This result was caused by the 
more than €12 billion of losses at Banco Popular Español following its resolution on 7 
June. Box 2.4 describes in detail the specific steps involved in the resolution of this 
institution.
To prevent the analysis of the income statement of deposit institutions as a whole from 
being distorted by the aforementioned case, this FSR examines the income statements of 
the rest of the system, that is, excluding the resolved institution. In order to ensure 
comparability with developments in the first half of 2016, the aforementioned institution 
has also been excluded from that period, so that the rates of change are calculated against 
comparable data (see Annex 2). The same applies to the analysis of the profitability of 
business in Spain. In these circumstances, deposit institutions as a whole obtained profits 
of €8,972 million attributable to the parent between January and June 2017, which is 
18.9% more than in 2016 H1. This increase has led to a rise of 7 bp in the return on assets 
(ROA), from 0.43% in June 2016 to 0.5% in June 2017. 
The contributions of the various items of the income statement to this increase in ROA are 
shown in Chart 2.18.A. On the positive side, net interest income and net commissions 
increased and impairment losses declined, while negative factors include the fall in gains 
and losses on financial transactions and the rise in operating expenses. 
... and the loan-deposit ratio 
again decreased
The net assets of investment 
funds increased due mainly 
to net subscriptions
2.2 Profitability
The negative result between 
January and June  was due 
to the loss at Banco Popular 
Español following its resolution
Excluding this institution, 
profits increased by 18.9% 
year-on-year, and ROA rose 
to 0.5% 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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On 6 June 2017 the European Central Bank (ECB), acting within 
the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),1 
pursuant to Article 18(1) of Regulation 806/2014/EU, the Single 
Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR), ruled that Banco 
Popular Español (BPE) was failing as a result of the serious 
difficulties it was facing.
The significant deterioration in the bank’s liquidity situation led the 
supervisor, the ECB (acting within the framework of the SSM), to 
conclude that BPE would, in the near future, be unable to pay its 
debts or other financial liabilities on maturity, or in other words, 
that it was failing or likely to fail (FOLTF).
Exercising the powers conferred on it, the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) ruled, in Decision SRB/EES/2017/08, that BPE met 
the conditions envisaged in Article 18(1) of the SRMR, including 
the absence of a private sector solution and the existence of 
public interest, and resolved, therefore, to declare BPE under 
resolution, proposing resolution arrangements indicating the 
measures to be applied.
The resolution arrangements established that the resolution tool to 
be applied was the sale of the business, in accordance with Article 
24 of the SRMR, further to the write-down and conversion of 
equity instruments ensued (Article 21 of the SRMR). First, the 
instruments eligible for consideration as Common Equity Tier 1 
(CET1) capital were written down, in order to create restricted 
reserves. At the same time, it was resolved to make a capital 
increase by conversion of the bank’s Additional Tier 1 (AT1) 
instruments, which were subsequently written down to create 
restricted reserves. Lastly, it was resolved to make a capital 
increase to convert the Tier 2 (T2) instruments into new shares.
Upon completion of all the above, it was resolved (acting in 
accordance with the new legal framework for Recovery and 
Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms (Directive 
2014/59/EU, the BRRD, and Regulation 806/2014/EU, the SRMR)), 
finally, to sell all the equity instruments to the purchaser, for a sale 
price of €1.
The resolution arrangements, approved by the European 
Commission on 7 June, in accordance with Article 18(7), was 
subsequently addressed to the FROB, the Spanish Executive 
Resolution Authority, in accordance with Articles 18(9) and 29 of 
the SRMR, for it to adopt all measures, exercising the powers 
conferred on it pursuant to Article 2(1)(d) of Law 11/2015, that 
would enable the correct application of the resolution procedure, 
complying with the principles and objectives inherent to its role.
Table A shows the flow of events and the competent authority at 
each decision stage.
BOX 2.4BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL RESOLUTION PROCESS
1  The Banco de España forms part of the SSM and sits on the SRB in a 
non-voting observer capacity.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Non-viability
ECB, acting within the 
framework of the SSM
Solution SRB
Implementation of 
resolution 
arrangements
FROB
(Executive Resolution 
Authority in Spain)
Approval of resolution 
arrangements European Commission
Determines the non-viability of the entity
SRB determines the resolution arrangements best suited to preserving
?nancial stability, once all private sector measures have been exhausted
FROB implements decisions taken by SRB for resolution of BPE, in 
accordance with objectives and principles of resolution
TABLE A
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL RESOLUTION PROCESS
Resolution arrangements approved by the 
European Commission
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Net interest income increased by 8% with respect to the same period a year earlier, largely 
owing to business abroad, as a result of the rise in financial revenue and, above all, the 
significant containment in financial costs (–7.2%). Although there is increasingly less scope 
to withstand further cuts (near-zero deposit remuneration), on average, institutions have 
managed to continue containing financial costs. This has led to the weight of net interest 
income in average total assets (ATA) increasing by 9 bp to 1.96% in the past year. Net 
commissions grew by 11%, their weight in the balance sheet also increasing, to 0.72%. 
There was a significant fall in gains on financial transactions (–16.1%), despite the 
improvement in exchange gains during this period, which has led to a reduction of 5 bp in 
the weight of this item in ATA, to 0.2%.
Operating expenses grew by 5%, contributing negatively to ROA and increasing their 
weight in ATA from 1.45% to 1.48% in the past year. Lastly, impairment losses continued 
to decline as in previous periods (–3.7% year-on-year), also decreasing as a percentage of 
ATA (see Chart 2.18.B), in line with the decrease in total consolidated non-performing 
assets and the total non-performing assets ratio (see Annex 1).
In keeping with ROA, the return on equity (ROE) increased by 70 bp in the past year to 
stand at 7.1%, compared with 6.4% in June 2016. Obviously, ROE would be negative 
(–3.1%) if the institution resolved in June is taken into account.
Compared with other European banking systems, the return on equity of the main Spanish 
banking institutions was 1.3 pp higher than the European average (7%) in June 2017, 
Net interest income improved 
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outstripping those of French, British or German banks (see Chart 2.19.A). The improved 
profitability of Spanish institutions is partly due to their more favourable relative position in 
terms of the cost of resources used to generate income, measured through the cost-to-
income ratio. As shown in Chart 2.19.B, Spanish institutions are significantly more efficient 
than the European average, with a cost-to-income ratio of 50.9%, compared with 61.5% 
of their European peers, and well above the ratios of Italy (56.4%), France (71.2%) or 
Germany (75.3%). 
The recently approved merger of two institutions majority-held by the FROB, and the 
resolution of the aforementioned institution, will also contribute to improving the efficiency 
of the Spanish banking system and bringing its capacity into line with the new competitive 
environment. In order to continue improving their efficiency, institutions can undertake 
corporate operations to reduce overcapacity, ideally also internationally, for example, 
between institutions from different EU countries.
With respect to business in Spain, according to the individual financial statements of 
deposit institutions, the return on assets (ROA) was somewhat higher than that of their 
consolidated activity (0.53% in June 2017, compared with 0.52% the previous year), while 
the return on equity was slightly lower than that of the consolidated groups, also declining 
slightly in the past year to 5.9%. If the institution resolved in June were not excluded, 
profitability would be clearly negative.
Net interest income in business in Spain fell by 1.8% year-on-year to stand at 0.97% of 
ATA, a somewhat higher weight than in the previous year (0.95%). Chart 2.20.A shows that 
net interest income has narrowed in recent years because the decrease in financial revenue 
has outweighed that in financial costs.
Net commissions have increased by 9.8% over the past year, largely owing to the strong 
growth of commissions associated with payment services (36% year-on-year) and despite 
the marked decline in commissions on the sale of banking products (–10% in June 2017). 
Together, these two types of commissions account for more than two thirds of total net 
commissions relating to business in Spain (see Chart 2.20.B).
In business in Spain, 
there were marginal changes 
in both ROA and ROE...
..., net interest income 
declined...
...and net commissions rose
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Operating expenses for business in Spain have decreased by 0.7% in the past year, 
following the downward trend observed in recent years. In the context of the observed 
containment of operating expenses, in 2017 institutions further adjusted their productive 
capacity through ongoing staff cuts and branch closures (see Chart 2.21.A). In June 2017, 
the number of branches in Spain was reduced by 7.4% year-on-year, while the number of 
employees fell by 4.3%. Chart 2.21.B shows the cumulative fall in the number of employees 
and branches of 32% and 39%, respectively, from their peak in 2008.
It should be noted that the significant adjustments carried out by Spanish institutions 
have enabled them to bring their customer service capacity, measured in terms of branch 
offices per 1,000 inhabitants, closer to the ratios of other European countries. Despite the 
notable effort, Spain remains at the head of the key EU countries with a ratio of 0.62 
branch offices per 1,000 inhabitants (see Chart 2.21.C). Although the number of branch 
offices of Spanish institutions is higher in per capita terms, their size is the smallest with 
respect to comparable countries, with barely 6.5 employees per office (see Chart 2.21.D). 
This figure is slightly higher than that observed in 2007 (6.1 employees per office), which 
reveals a slight tendency towards increasing the size of branch offices as their numbers 
are reduced. Box 2.5 provides a more in-depth analysis of the changes in the number of 
bank branches in Spain, in relation to the size of the population of the municipalities in 
which they are located.
Operating expenses continued 
to fall...
...owing to the significant 
cuts by Spanish institutions in 
employees and branch offices
SOURCES: Banco de España, European Central Bank and Eurostat.
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Since 2008, the Spanish banking system has been undergoing a 
significant reduction in capacity. Among other factors of 
production, this has involved an adjustment in the number of 
branches serving customers. Thus, for example, the total number 
of branches of deposit institutions stood at 27,811 in June 2017, 
as against 45,084 in December 2007, a decline of 38%. However, 
the reasons for and the severity of the decline, as well as the 
consequences for people’s access to financial services, are not 
uniform across Spain, but vary according to the size of the 
municipality in question.
Charts A and B show, for 2016, the distribution of bank branches 
and of the Spanish population,1 according to the number of 
inhabitants of the municipality in which they are situated. As seen 
in the charts, the proportion of branches in municipalities with a 
population of up to 10,000 is higher than the weight of these 
municipalities in terms of population. This means that, due to their 
limited size, the smallest municipalities require a larger effort from 
banks, in terms of geographical presence, to give their inhabitants 
access to the banking network.
Chart C, meanwhile, shows how the number of branches per 
1,000 inhabitants has changed since 1998, for Spanish 
municipalities grouped according to their size. As seen in the 
chart, the reduction in the number of branches per 1,000 
inhabitants has not been solely a result of the capacity adjustments 
triggered by the economic crisis that began in late 2007. Rather, it 
has also been part of a process that, in small municipalities (those 
with a population of up to 20,000), has been taking place since at 
least 1998, with falls of between 2% and 8% over the period 1998-
2007. These developments contrast with those seen during the 
same period in the largest municipalities (those with a population 
of more than 20,000), in which the number of branches per 1,000 
inhabitants had increased by around 9% by 2008. The economic 
crisis was a turning point for the banking sector, instigating 
significant concentration operations and general adjustments in 
institutions’ capacity. Since 2008, as also seen in Chart C, it has 
been these large municipalities that have witnessed the largest 
reductions in the number of branches per head, precisely the ones 
that had experienced the largest increases in the previous decade.
Charts D, E and F allow us to analyse the process of bank capacity 
adjustment in greater detail during the period analysed as a whole 
(Chart D) and during the sub-periods 1998-2007 (Chart E) and 2007-
2016 (Chart F). These charts show how the adjustment in branch 
numbers in municipalities is related to the change in their population, 
grouping municipalities according to the number of their inhabitants 
in 1998.2 Chart D shows that the reduction in the number of branches 
since 1998 is a phenomenon that has affected all Spanish 
municipalities, although with varying degrees of intensity. The 
sharpest declines are seen in the smallest municipalities (with up to 
500 inhabitants). These municipalities also stand out as being the 
only ones to suffer a net decline in population between 1998 and 
2016, against the background of rural population decline which 
Spain has been experiencing for decades. In the case of medium-
sized and large municipalities, the adjustment in bank capacity, with 
a reduction in the number of branches of 16%-31%, contrasts with 
the growth in population, at rates of 1%-27%.
Distinguishing between periods, Chart E allows us to analyse 
developments in bank capacity between 1998 and 2007, a period of 
economic expansion and rapid credit growth. The chart shows that 
the change in the number of branches varied according to the size of 
the municipality. In the smallest municipalities (up to 1,000 
inhabitants) the number of branches decreased despite the mild 
growth in population in municipalities with more than 100 inhabitants. 
Municipalities of between 1,000 and 10,000 inhabitants saw growth 
in the number of branches, although at a slower rate than the growth 
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1  The population data used come from the continuous population register 
statistics published by the INE. The end-2015 population data are used 
for 2016 owing to the unavailability of data for that year.
2  To avoid the number of branches of a particular group of municipalities 
changing as a result of the reclassification of municipalities due to 
population losses or gains during the period considered, it was decided 
to maintain the assignment of each municipality to a particular population 
interval in accordance with the population in 1998.
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BOX 2.5ACCESS TO THE SPANISH BANK BRANCH NETWORK BY SIZE OF MUNICIPALITY (cont’d)
smallest municipalities has been a consequence, at least in part, 
of the loss of inhabitants suffered by these municipalities as a 
result of the rural population decline in Spain. On the other hand, 
this demographic process has been accompanied in recent years 
by bank capacity adjustments in response to the economic crisis 
and to the consequences of the crisis for the sector. In this context 
of restructuring of the industry, the reduction in branch numbers in 
medium-sized and large cities is notable.
Finally, in order to determine the extent to which the reduction in 
bank capacity in the period 2007-2016 has affected people’s 
access to financial services, Charts G and H show the percentage 
of inhabitants and municipalities without access to a bank branch. 
As seen in these charts, access to a bank branch in the smallest 
municipalities (with up to 500 inhabitants) was already very limited 
in 2007, when the total number of bank branches in Spain was 
close to its peak, and this situation remained the same in 2016. For 
example, the percentage of the population of municipalities with 
100-500 inhabitants that had no access to a branch was 70% in 
in population. In the largest municipalities, the growth in the number 
of branches, at rates of 19%-33%, matched or even exceeded the 
population growth during these years of 9%-23%.
Chart F, on the other hand, focuses on the period 2007-2016. In 
this period, characterised by economic crisis and the subsequent 
recovery, there was a fall in the number of branches in all the 
municipality categories, although there was a difference between 
small and large towns. In small municipalities the rate of fall stood 
between 21% and 41%, the smaller the municipality and the larger 
the reduction in terms of population the larger the fall. In the case 
of municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants, the reduction 
in capacity ranged from 36% to 42%, a more marked decline than 
in the smaller municipalities, despite the increase in population in 
medium-sized towns during this period.
To sum up, these charts show that capacity reduction at Spanish 
banks over the last two decades has been a consequence of two 
separate processes. On one hand, the loss of branches in the 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
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BOX 2.5ACCESS TO THE SPANISH BANK BRANCH NETWORK BY SIZE OF MUNICIPALITY (cont’d)
network, between 2007 and 2016, in municipalities with 1,000-
10,000 inhabitants was very small.
In terms of the Spanish population as a whole, the percentage of 
people without access to a bank branch in their municipality of 
residence has risen from 2% in 2007 to 2.5% in 2016 (Chart G), 
although the number of municipalities without a bank branch 
increased by somewhat more during this period, from 44% to 50% 
(Chart H).
2007, and 75% in 2016 (see Chart G). In municipalities with 500-
1,000 inhabitants the capacity adjustment has had a more 
significant effect on the population’s access to financial services. 
In particular, the proportion of the population without access to a 
branch rose from 27% in 2007 to 39% in 2016 (Chart G). In terms 
of municipalities without a bank branch the impact is similar, as 
these rose from 28% in 2007 to 40% in 2016, in the case of the 
same group of municipalities, with a population of 500-1,000 
inhabitants (Chart H). The change in access to the branch 
In the context of profitability, mention must be made of the technological innovation 
process which is already affecting the banking sector in different ways and is one of the 
main challenges facing institutions in the coming years. This challenge has two distinct 
dimensions: on the one hand, it presents institutions with great opportunities both as 
regards cost-reduction potential in the medium term, and the possibility of broadening the 
range and quality of services to customers. However, such innovation is not straightforward 
since it may require institutions to undertake major organisational and management 
changes, as well as substantial investments in technology and a new corporate culture. On 
the other, the traditional banking business faces increasing competition from new operators 
known as «fintechs». This challenge has led some institutions to step up their investments 
in technology in an attempt to counter the impact of these new firms (including by acquiring 
them), resulting in sizeable investments the returns on which are still uncertain and which 
may require lengthy maturity processes. Such uncertainty is heightened by the drive for 
technological change currently under way in the banking sector, among others, which may 
bring about a major transformation in the medium term.
Undoubtedly, in areas competing for traditional services, such as the provision of credit, 
experience and market expertise will give a competitive edge to banking institutions better 
able to exploit the advantages of technological developments in the form of more direct 
and quicker access to their customers. However, in the provision of certain other 
Technological innovation will 
be a challenge for institutions 
in the coming years, bringing 
both business opportunities 
and competition from new 
operators know as “fintechs”
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
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complementary services, mostly relating to payment operations, this advantage may 
disappear, with the subsequent reduction of the business volume and its impact in terms 
of profitability.
In any case, as mentioned in previous FSRs, the process of technological innovation does 
not come without risks, not only those arising from finding and realising new and profitable 
investments, but also traditional risks such as credit risk (arising from the use of different 
mobile devices and new technological channels to easily access new customer strata 
such as the younger population), and others (data privacy and protection, fraud, greater 
interconnectedness or even cyber-attacks), generally compounded by the speed at which 
the changes are taking place.
Although the profitability of deposit institutions has remained under considerable pressure, 
the increase in profits with respect to the previous year has enabled Spanish institutions to 
perform favourably on the stock market in the past year. Specifically, since end-October 
2016 to end-October 2017, the stock market value of Spanish institutions rose by 26%, in 
line with the average of the European financial institutions(see Chart 2.22.A). Since the 
beginning of 2016, and despite a very unfavourable situation in the early part of that year, 
Spanish institutions have posted an increase of 16% in their stock prices, notably above 
average for euro area institutions (7%) or European institutions as a whole (2%). The price 
The higher profits have led to 
a favourable stock market 
performance of Spanish 
institutions in the past year...
SOURCE: Datastream.
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to book value ratio has since increased for Spanish institutions to stand at a level close to 
one in October 2017. This ratio is clearly higher than the European banking sector average 
(see Chart 2.22.B).
The favourable trend was interrupted in early October. Chart 2.22.C shows how the lack of 
stability has affected Spanish institutions, particularly those previously registered in 
Catalonia, leading them to take their headquarters elsewhere.
As Chart 2.23 shows, in June 2017 the ratio of highest-quality capital, common equity tier 
1 (CET1), stood at 11.9%, a decrease of 72 bp with respect to the ratio reached in June 
2016 (12.6%). The tier 1 capital ratio stood at 12.3% (compared with 12.8% a year earlier), 
and the total capital ratio at 14.4% (14.6% in June 2016).3
The lower solvency ratios were the result of a decline in the level of CET1 capital, which 
could not be offset by the increases in additional tier 1 (AT1) and tier 2 (T2) capital, or by 
the lower volume of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) (see Chart 2.24.A). The numerator of the 
solvency ratios can be explained by the predominance of CET1 in the composition of own 
funds, which in June 2017 accounted for 82% of the total (see Chart 2.24.B). Additional 
tier 1 capital (which counts as tier 1 capital but not as CET1) represented 3% of own 
funds and tier 2 capital accounted for the remaining 15%. 
Chart 2.24.C. gives a breakdown of the composition of CET1 in terms of RWAs. As the 
chart shows, equity instruments are the main component of this measure of capital 
(47%), followed by reserves (36%). Minority interests and other represent 10% of CET1, 
while transitional adjustments declined to 6% in June 2017, as Basel III is gradually 
implemented.4 
3  It should be noted that the solvency position in recent months has been conditioned by the resolution of Banco 
Popular Español in June 2017, following which the acquiring institution carried out a capital increase of €7 billion 
in July in order to improve the solvency of the institution resulting from the acquisition. The solvency measures 
reported in this FSR refer to June 2017 and therefore do not take into account the capital increase. This, together 
with the losses at Banco Popular Español in June 2017, would largely explain the decline in the solvency ratios.
4  The ratios take into account the gradual transitional adjustments designed to facilitate the progressive 
implementation of Basel III. The implementation timetable establishes generally in 2017 that 80% of the amounts 
of deductions will be deducted from common equity, while the remaining 20% will be deducted from additional 
tier 1 capital.
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As regards the composition of risk-weighted assets (the denominator of the solvency 
ratios) credit and counterparty risk constitute the bulk (87%) of total RWAs, followed by 
operational risk (9%) and position, foreign exchange and commodity risks (3%). The 
remaining risks barely represent 1% of institutions’ total RWAs (see Chart 2.24.D).
The Banco de España has an internal tool used to prospectively analyse the resilience of 
Spanish institutions in terms of solvency and liquidity under different macroeconomic scenarios. 
This tool underpins the stress tests conducted by the Banco de España at Spanish deposit 
institutions, in line with other tests conducted internationally, for example the US Comprehensive 
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) or the European stress tests coordinated by the EBA.
FLESB framework for stress testing 
The stress tests developed by the Banco de España are based on a tool with a top-down 
approach, which employs homogeneous methodological assumptions defined by the 
national regulator and uses highly granular data. This analysis framework is known as the 
FLESB (Forward Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks). The main features of this tool were 
described in the November 2013 FSR.5 Since then, the Banco de España has improved 
5  See Financial Stability Report, Banco de España: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/
InformesBoletinesRevistas/InformesEstabilidadFinancera/13/IEF_Ing_Noviembre2013.pdf
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the stress test methodology, in terms of both the data used and the main calculation 
methods employed, and the scope of the risks considered. 
The stress tests carried out in the FLESB framework use macroeconomic scenarios that have 
to be stringent but plausible.6 The impact of such scenarios on the balance sheet and business 
of banking institutions is projected using different auxiliary models, most notably those for 
calculating expected credit losses over a specific time horizon. This impairment of exposures 
is then compared with loss-absorbing items, such as existing provisions, estimated profit 
before provisions for the analysis time horizon and the excess capital available.
As part of the ongoing efforts to improve the FLESB, the 2017 exercise incorporates an 
analysis of the liquidity position of each institution, based on the liquidity coverage ratio 
(LCR). This analysis is in response to the growing interest in assessing the strength of 
financial institutions not only in terms of solvency but also in terms of an asset structure 
which is sufficiently balanced to withstand restrictions on, or even falls, in funding 
sources and increased market volatility. Although they are complementary, the solvency 
and liquidity analyses carried out within the FLESB framework use different 
methodologies and scenarios, defined with a view to identifying institutions’ specific 
vulnerabilities.
For the solvency test, three scenarios were considered: a baseline scenario, which is the 
best estimate of future macroeconomic conditions, and two alternative adverse scenarios 
which reflect an economic environment worse than that of the baseline stress scenario. 
These scenarios are the same as those used by the IMF in the stress test exercise 
performed on the Spanish banking system as part of the FSAP, which assesses the 
situation of the Spanish financial system as a whole. As the two adverse scenarios show 
similar impacts on the CET1 ratio, this report shows only the results obtained for the 
baseline scenario and the adverse scenario with less favourable developments in GDP. 
This variable is used to summarise the change in the level of stress between the adverse 
and baseline scenarios, although both comprise a wider set of variables (unemployment 
rate, interest rates, house prices, etc.). The starting point for the stress test exercise is 
December 2016 and the time horizon covers the years 2017, 2018, 2019.
Chart 2.25 compares GDP growth over the time horizon of the exercise in the baseline and 
adverse scenarios. The adverse scenario shows negative growth of –1.9% and –3.0% for 
2017 and 2018, compared with positive growth expected for the baseline scenario. 
Positive growth is only projected for the two scenarios in the last year of the exercise, 
albeit lower in the adverse scenario. In cumulative three-year terms, there is growth of 
6.6% in the baseline scenario and of –3.5% in the adverse scenario. The accumulated 
difference of more than 10 percentage points between the two scenarios is an additional 
indicator of the severity of the adverse scenario. 
Results of the FLESB methodology: solvency
The Spanish banking system is heterogeneous as regards the degree of international 
exposure and size of its institutions, which can be classified into different groups depending 
on these variables. Since institutions belonging to different groups show varying degrees 
6   The need for the scenarios to be plausible is not an obstacle to exploring scenarios that do not provide probable 
economic performance forecasts. The main objective of using extreme scenarios is precisely to assess the 
impact on institutions’ solvency of a hypothetical shock involving a certain deviation of the macroeconomic 
variables from the baseline scenario.
In the current exercise, 
the FLESB framework has 
incorporated a liquidity test 
based on the LCR
The adverse macroeconomic 
scenario used in the FLESB 
exercise includes a significant 
level of stress, with a sharp 
decline in GDP in Spain
Solvency assessments are 
performed for institutions 
with significant international 
activity, other SSM institutions 
and less significant institutions
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of exposure to different sources of risk, it is reasonable to assess the results of each of 
these groups separately. 
First, institutions with significant international activity are considered.7 The FLESB 
framework analyses business in Spain, among other things, by calculating the expected 
losses on individual exposures, on the basis of the highly granular data available. Business 
abroad, for which available data is less granular, is analysed on the basis of income 
statement projections and, particularly, the net income or loss generated in each of the 
main foreign subsidiaries. This projection is based on international macroeconomic 
variables included in each scenario considered.
The remaining institutions, those without significant international activity, are divided in 
turn into those forming part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which are larger 
and more complex (significant institutions), and the rest, which are under the direct 
supervision of the Banco de España (less significant institutions). This division of institutions 
into groups is the same as that used in the forward-looking solvency assessment of 
deposit institutions included in the November 2016 FSR.8
7  In accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 680/2014 of 16 April 2014 laying down 
technical standards with regard to supervisory reporting of institutions, an institution is deemed to engage in 
significant international activity when exposures abroad and in all exposure categories equal or exceed 10% of 
total exposures. In this connection, three institutions have been identified as meeting this condition which, as at 
December 2016, accounted for 65.5% of the total assets of the Spanish banking system at consolidated level.
8  See: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/InformesEstabilidad 
Financera/16/FSRNovember2016.pdf 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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For each group of institutions, the impact of the scenarios on the fully loaded CET1 ratio9 
is shown in the time horizon of the exercise under the baseline scenario (scenario more 
likely to occur) and the adverse scenario (with very low probability of occurrence). The 
accumulated effect of gross credit losses and of the use of existing provisions in the 2017-
2019 period is detailed, both items in relation to business in Spain and shown as a 
percentage of RWAs in 2016. The accumulated effect of estimated results10 (on RWAs in 
2016) is shown separately, as are the other effects on the CET1 (tax effects, changes in 
RWAs, distribution of results, etc.). 
Chart 2.26 shows a substantial improvement in the solvency of institutions with significant 
international activity under the baseline scenario. The fully-loaded CET1 ratio increases from 
the starting point of 10.8% to 12.9% in 2019, as a result of significant income generation (5% 
of RWAs), and a contained volume of gross losses in Spain (3.7% of RWAs) that is largely 
offset by the use of existing provisions (2.5% of RWAs). The higher exposure and the tax paid 
on the income generated under the baseline scenario contribute to the negative impact of the 
remaining factors, reducing the ratio at the end of the exercise by 1.6 pp. 
In the adverse scenario, a fall of one percentage point is observed in the CET1 ratio for this 
group of institutions. The adverse macroeconomic conditions of this scenario give rise to 
a higher volume of losses (6.4% of RWAs) and substantially reduce the ability to generate 
income (3.3% of RWAs), which is not sufficient to absorb losses, despite more intensive 
use of existing provisions (2.7% of RWAs). In view of the weaker growth of RWAs under 
the adverse scenario and the lower amount of distributable income, the negative impact of 
the remaining factors is less marked, with a decline of only 0.6 pp in the CET1 ratio. 
The impact of these scenarios on other remaining institutions under the direct supervision 
of the SSM is shown in Chart 2.27. Under the baseline scenario, there is an increase of 0.8 
pp in the CET1 ratio between 2016 and 2019, less than that observed for institutions with 
significant international activity. This is largely due to the greater negative contribution of 
9   The fully loaded CET1 is calculated as the sum of all eligible capital elements at a given date less the full 
deductions established by the regulation, without considering the reduction of deductions according to the 
adjustment schedule known as phase-in. 
10  Estimated results include both the net pre-provision profit of business in Spain and the contribution to the net 
income attributable to the controlling entity of the group subsidiaries.
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losses for this group of institutions (11.3% of RWAs). However, income generation (5.2% 
of RWAs) and the use of existing provisions (7.8% of RWAs) are sufficient to absorb the 
negative impacts.
Under the adverse scenario, the CET1 ratio stands at 7.3% in 2019, implying a fall of 4 pp 
during the time horizon of the exercise. The impact of losses increases to 16.5% of RWAs, 
exceeding the positive contributions from the use of existing provisions (8.3% of RWAs) and 
income generation (4% of RWAs). The impact of the remaining factors is positive, but 
negligible. In any case, the CET1 ratio remains above the minimum regulatory threshold for 
this group of institutions as a whole, albeit with a high degree of dispersion across institutions.
Lastly, Chart 2.28 shows the impact of the exercise on less significant institutions as a 
whole, under direct national supervision. Under the baseline scenario, the ratio remains 
broadly constant and increases by barely 0.1 pp to 16.9% in 2019. Losses (5.3% of RWAs) 
are amply offset by the use of provisions (3.4% of RWAs) and income generated (4.3% of 
RWAs). The remaining factors (growth of RWAs, tax burden, etc.) reduce the ratio by 2.3 
pp, resulting in a negligible impact. 
… and falls by 4 pp under 
the adverse scenario, to stand 
at 7.3% in 2019
The fully-loaded CET1 ratio 
of the group of less significant 
institutions remains broadly 
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scenario and declines by 2.6 
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For this group of institutions, the adverse scenario does lead to a larger volume of losses 
(9% of RWAs), exceeding the volume of resources capable of absorbing them: provisions 
(3.9% of RWAs) and income generated (3% of RWAs). The fully-loaded CET1 ratio declines 
by 2.6 pp, to stand at 14.2% at December 2019. In any event, the ratio remains well above 
the regulatory minimum required at the end of the time horizon of the exercise, aided by 
the high level of these ratios at the start of the exercise in December 2016 (16.8%). 
Results of the FLESB methodology: liquidity
The LCR has been analysed under the applicable regulatory assumptions, and under two 
adverse scenarios with highly significant outflows of wholesale and retail funding. By 
definition, the LCR measures whether, in a scenario of liquidity stress lasting 30 calendar 
days, an institution maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high-quality liquid 
assets (HQLA) to meet its net funding needs. The baseline assumptions used in this 
exercise are the parameters resulting from the European transposition of the Basel III LCR 
regulation. Moreover, the LCR is calculated under two much more severe scenarios: the 
first contemplates a substantially greater withdrawal of retail funding and secured funding 
(basically central bank funding), while the second scenario considers notably higher 
withdrawals of wholesale funding (withdrawal of 100% of operational deposits). As in the 
solvency exercise, these scenarios are the same as those used by the IMF in the liquidity 
stress test exercise conducted as part of the FSAP. Both scenarios are based on extreme 
assumptions, with extremely high funding withdrawals. The reference date is December 
2016 and the analysis horizon covers the subsequent 30 days. Chart 2.29 shows the main 
differences in the assumptions regarding funding withdrawal ratios under the different 
scenarios (panel A refers to the assumptions relating to households and SME funding, and 
panel B includes the assumptions relating to wholesale and central bank funding).
The results of the analysis presented in Chart 2.30 show that Spanish institutions have a 
robust liquidity situation, since all groups of institutions exceed the minimum LRC 
requirements set for 2017 (80%). Under the regulatory assumptions, all groups amply 
exceed the minimum LCR requirement of 80% in 2017, the larger institutions with 
significant international activity presenting a tighter ratio (140%). For institutions under 
SSM supervision, scenario 2 (falls to approximate LCR levels of 80% for institutions with 
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significant international activity and of 116% for other SSM institutions) has a greater 
impact than scenario 1, indicating that these institutions are relatively more dependent on 
wholesale funding. In contrast, less significant institutions are more severely affected by 
scenario 1, showing higher vulnerability to retail funding withdrawals, while still maintaining 
ample liquidity reserves. The extreme severity of the scenarios, given its very low probability 
of occurrence, implies for all groups reductions of approximately 50% in the LCR with 
respect to the regulatory assumptions used for this ratio.
...in excess of the regulatory 
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3 MACROPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY
The latest update of the map of systemic vulnerabilities indicators1 for Spain shows that 
such vulnerabilities have been holding stable since the publication of the last FSR 
(see Chart 3.1). This map of indicators is grouped into five categories. The credit category 
groups together indicators of the changes in and degree of imbalance in total and banking 
credit to households, non-financial corporations and the non-financial private sector as a 
whole; these sectors’ level of debt and debt burden; the interest rates on new lending 
business and on outstanding balances; and changes and imbalances in house prices. The 
liquidity category includes indicators of banking and market liquidity. The concentration 
category includes indicators of total and banking credit concentration in different sectors 
and by type of borrower. The financial markets category groups together indicators of 
correlations and interconnectedness of banking institutions and of systemic stress in 
different markets. The macroeconomic imbalances category includes indicators of external 
debt, public-sector debt and the current account balance. The concentric line closest to 
the centre of the chart corresponds to the normal situation, while the degree of risk is on a 
growing course the greater the distance to the centre. 
Chart 3.1 shows that the vulnerabilities relating to macroeconomic imbalances, liquidity, 
financial markets and credit are holding at low levels, which reflects the favourable course 
the Spanish economy is continuing to experience along with the gradual improvements in 
credit developments. The concentration in various credit portfolios is holding stable and at 
an average level. Within this category it is worth noting that the indicators relating to credit 
concentration in the sectors most affected by the latest crisis (construction and real estate 
development activities) have been declining continuously since the start of the crisis. 
An in-depth analysis of Chart 3.1 provides for a time study of these vulnerabilities, and for 
decomposing certain categories in a more disaggregated fashion so as to be able to 
identify, more accurately, the source of the values observed. In this connection, it is 
advisable to represent the vulnerabilities in the form of a map of colours that enables 
1  This Banco de España tool draws together information from over 100 indicators of potential risk to the financial 
system and conditions in the real economy and the banking sector in Spain. The definitions of the main categories 
match those established by the European Systemic Risk Board in its Recommendation (ESRB/2013/1) on 
intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policy.
3.1  Analysis of systemic 
vulnerabilities
The systemic vulnerabilities 
indicators are holding stable 
With its colour scheme, the map 
of these indicators is a tool 
that helps visualise the historical 
trend of each category 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a A concentric line closer to the centre of the chart refers to a normal situation, while the higher the risk level, the greater the distance to the centre.
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their course over time to be studied. In this map, the tone indicates the intensity of the 
warnings on the vulnerabilities studied. The intensity increases as the tone draws closer to 
red, while the colour green would indicate a normal situation. Hence, Chart 3.2 shows 
firstly potential vulnerabilities and their developments over time through this map of 
colours. The term “potential vulnerabilities” is used because these indicators are 
characterised by the fact they provide early warning signals about situations that may 
result in specific problems in the financial system and the real economy, or even in a 
systemic crisis in the most extreme cases. The main categories of these vulnerabilities 
correspond to those presented earlier in Chart 3.1. In addition, the developments in a 
second block, called “current economic and financial situation”, are presented. This block 
captures the materialisation of the potential vulnerabilities in problems for the financial 
system and the real economy. This is done through indicators relating to the real economy, 
such as economic growth and the unemployment level, and other financial indicators, 
including bank NPLs. 
Within the first block, the breakdown into certain significant sub-categories is presented. 
It can be seen how, before the recent crisis (the period indicated in grey in Chart 3.2), 
most categories (credit, liquidity, macroeconomic imbalances and, to a lesser extent, 
concentration) showed signs of high vulnerability (in red). Once the crisis was under way, 
the risk diminished gradually to levels of low risk in most of the sub-categories. 
Accordingly, these categories show the possibility of identifying vulnerabilities ahead of 
the materialisation of such vulnerabilities in the form of actual problems. Moreover, it can 
be seen that the indicators related to financial markets are not characterised by such a 
clear crisis-anticipation capacity, but they do signal the high risk prevailing at the height 
of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Lastly, the last row of Chart 3.2 shows the economic 
and financial situation over time. Green is the prevalent colour during the expansionary 
period as the economy is growing at high rates, and because the existing vulnerabilities 
have not yet transformed into losses either for the financial system or the real economy. 
However, after the crisis broke, it can be seen how the vulnerabilities discernible in 
the first block of Chart 3.2 rapidly fed through to the current economic and financial 
situation (in red). 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The latest update of the map of indicators, with data as at June 2017, shows a stable 
situation with respect to recent quarters in most sub-categories. The vulnerabilities 
remain at a normal level in the sub-categories relating to developments in and imbalance 
of credit, real estate sector prices, the debt burden of the non-financial private sector 
and the category of extreme events in the financial markets, to which an improvement in 
some indicators of the real economy should be added. Also, current economic and 
financial situation has improved slightly in Q2, standing at a low level. The changes in 
this category, which reflect the consequences of the recent crisis on the real economy 
and the financial system, show the progress of normalisation, which is, however, not 
yet complete. 
The map of indicators suggests we are at a conjunctural position that is part of the 
downturn in the financial cycle, albeit ahead of a stage of gradual recovery. Against this 
background, the indicators will foreseeably continue to reflect an improving trend in 
the coming quarters marked by the absence of warning signals stemming from cyclical 
vulnerabilities. The assessment inferred from the analysis of the map of indicators would 
not, for the moment, advise resorting to the activation of cyclical macroprudential 
instruments (such as the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB)). In addition to the absence 
of significant warnings, a premature activation of cyclical macroprudential instruments 
might endanger this recovery.
This analysis of cyclical vulnerabilities coincides with the quarterly assessment published 
by the Banco de España on the indicators that offer guidance as to decisions on the 
CCyB and which has led to the decision to maintain the rate applicable to domestic 
credit exposures at 0% since its entry into force on 1 January 2016.2 Specifically, the 
setting of the CCyB is governed by a “guided discretion” approach, in which 
the percentage of this instrument is determined by analysis of various quantitative 
indicators, combined with the analysis of qualitative information and the institution’s 
expert judgement. 
Among the quantitative indicators used, the main reference is the credit-to-GDP gap, 
defined as the difference between the credit-to-gross domestic product ratio in relation 
to its long-term trend, determined by statistical procedures.3 This indicator is that 
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and is incorporated 
into current European and Spanish legislation for guidance on the setting of the CCyB by 
means of a European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation.4 Although the calculation 
of this indicator is made using common criteria, certain divergences between the results 
published by different institutions can be observed. These differences, which are not 
ultimately significant, are due to the different numerical approaches that arise in the 
application of the definition to specific data (see Box 3.1). On March 2017 data, the gap 
stands at –59.6pp, far below the levels that would advise activation of the CCyB.5 
Chart 3.3.A shows the changes in the level of the gap, along with the credit-to-GDP ratio 
and its long-term trend.
2  “The Banco de España maintains the countercyclical capital buffer at 0%”, Banco de España press release dated 
25 September 2017.
3  The set of quantitative indicators which the Banco de España monitors for guidance as to the setting of the CCyB 
also comprises indicators related to credit growth, house prices, debt service and the current account balance. 
All these indicators vindicate the decision to maintain the CCyB at 0%.
4  Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV), Law 10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015, Banco de España Circular 2/2016 and 
ESRB Recommendation 2014/1.
5  The Banco de España, in accordance with BCBS guidance, considers the level of 2 pp as the reference level for 
a possible activation of the CCyB.
The analysis of cyclical 
vulnerabilities does 
not advise a tightening 
of macroprudential stance
The map of indicators shows 
a downturn in the financial 
cycle, pointing to a gradual 
recovery
The setting 
of the countercyclical capital 
buffer is governed 
by a “guided discretion” 
approach based on indicators
The level of the credit-to-GDP 
gap and other complementary 
indicators advise keeping 
the CCyB rate at 0% in Spain
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BOX 3.1COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGIES USED TO CALCULATE THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP
The credit-to-GDP gap is the quantitative indicator proposed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)1 as a 
reference to guide the setting of the countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCyB). This indicator is recognised both in European law,2 and in 
Spanish law,3 and also by the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB).4 The credit-to-GDP gap seeks to measure excess credit 
(in terms of GDP) with respect to its long-term (or equilibrium) 
level. The gap is calculated as the difference (in percentage points) 
between the ratio of total credit to the private non-financial sector 
to GDP and the long-term trend in this ratio, estimated using a 
statistical filter.5 
Spain’s credit-to-GDP gap is calculated and published regularly 
by the Banco de España, and also by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In each 
case quarterly data are used. Chart A shows the credit-to-GDP 
gap published by each authority. It can be seen that, although 
the general trends in this indicator are very similar, there are certain 
differences in levels, which in some periods are large. There are 
two main reasons that explain these differences, one of which 
is methodological and the other of which relates to the time 
horizon used.
With regard to the methodological differences, the gap that 
the Banco de España has been publishing is obtained by 
calculating the long-term trend based on the credit-to-GDP ratio 
series in logarithms. In contrast, the ECB and the BIS use the 
absolute-value series. The reason for using the log series is to 
reduce variability and therefore to have a smoother series, this 
being a normal practice in the treatment of macroeconomic 
series with significant changes in level, like the credit-to-GDP 
ratio in Spain.
The differences between the gaps calculated with and without 
logarithmic transformation of the credit-to-GDP ratio are observed 
in Chart A, using Banco de España data in both cases. It can be 
seen that the series calculated by the Banco de España with 
and without logarithms coincide almost exactly over most of the 
sample period, until the crisis had begun (around the year 2010) 
when the two series begin to diverge. The rapid reduction in the 
credit-to-GDP ratio from the start of the crisis means that using 
logarithms to calculate the trend produces a more negative gap. 
This is because the use of logarithms smooths the trend, which 
remains high in relation to the rapid reduction in the observed 
value of the credit-to-GDP ratio. As at March 2017 (latest available 
data) the difference between the two methods of calculating the 
gap was 11.3 percentage points.
Differences are also seen between the series published by the ECB 
and the BIS and the one published by the Banco de España that 
does not use logarithms. The reason for the differences in these 
cases is the length of the time series for the credit-to-GDP ratio 
used to calculate the long-term trend. While the Banco de España 
calculates the gap from 1970 Q1,6 the ECB does so from 1997 Q4 
and the BIS from 1980 Q1. In principle, the statistical filter 
SOURCES: Banco de España, European Central Bank and Bank for International Settlements.
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1  BCBS (2010). Guidance for national authorities operating the 
countercyclical capital buffer. December. See Annex 1.
2  Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms. See Articles 135 and 136.
3  Law 10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015 and, in particular, Banco de España 
Circular 2/2016 to credit institutions on supervision and solvency, which 
completes the adaptation of Spanish law to Directive 2013/36/EU and to 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. See Rule 9 of the Circular.
4  Recommendation of the ESRB of 18 June 2014 on guidance for setting 
countercyclical buffer rates (ESRB/2014/1). See Recommendation B.
5  A one-tailed Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 
400,000.
6  Another difference between the series is the window or initial period of time 
for which the observed values are taken into account but for which the gap 
is not calculated. The purpose of this window is to ensure that there are 
sufficient observations to obtain a trend with which to compare the 
observed values. The Banco de España uses a 20-quarter window, while 
the BIS uses a 40-quarter one.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 77 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2017
In addition to the level of the gap, it is worth monitoring its changes and the determinants 
thereof. This exercise is presented in Chart 3.3.B, which shows the year-on-year change 
in the gap and in the main components that determine its trend (GDP, credit to households, 
credit to non-financial corporations and long-term trend). The values of the gap can be seen 
to continue to be very low, chiefly owing to the fact that credit continues to post negative 
growth rates, to the positive growth of GDP (the denominator of the ratio) and to the high 
inertia of the long-term trend, which continues to have very high values. Nonetheless, in 
recent quarters the trend has been the only component that affects the gap positively insofar 
as it begins to incorporate the prolonged decline in credit during the crisis years through a 
gradual decline in its level. This behaviour is expected to continue and, to the extent that the 
contraction in lending activity continues to ease, or begins to show positive growth rates, it 
will give rise to a correction in the values of the credit-to-GDP gap.
Finally, as regards other developments of macroprudential interest relating to initiatives 
promoted by the European Systemic Risk Board, it is worth noting that the Banco de 
España has updated the list of material third countries for Spain for the purposes 
The first steps 
in correcting the credit-to-GDP 
gap could be taken 
by adjusting its trend 
component and by easing 
the contraction 
in lending activity
BOX 3.1COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGIES USED TO CALCULATE THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (cont’d)
that determines the long-term trend is considered to behave 
more robustly with long series, to avoid the results being excessively 
dependent on the conjunctural situations existing in a specific 
period. Comparing the latest values of the credit-to-GDP gap 
supplied by the three institutions mentioned above, it can be 
seen that the differences between the series calculated without 
logarithms are very small in the case of the series of the Banco de 
España and of the BIS. This is because of the similarity of the 
samples used to calculate the trend. Meanwhile, the series of 
the ECB, which uses a significantly shorter sample, gives values 
for the gap that are 4.9 pp and 5.5 pp smaller than those given by 
the BIS and the Banco de España series, respectively.
The conclusions regarding developments in credit and cyclical 
risk do not vary from one series to another. However, it is 
important to be aware of the existence of these differences 
in the values published by different sources and the reasons 
for them.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area shows the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1-2013 Q4).
b The credit-to-GDP gap is the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and the trend.
c? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
d? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
the credit-to-GDP gap.
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of the CCyB (see Box 3.2), adhering to the best methodological practices followed in the 
EU. Moreover, the Banco de España has continued to make progress in its work to develop 
an analytical framework for the assessment of the potential cross-border effects of 
macroprudential measures. This framework would be applicable for analysing the effects 
of the measures that the Banco de España envisages adopting in the future, and the 
impact on the Spanish financial system of the measures introduced by other countries’ 
authorities.
BOX 3.2MATERIAL THIRD COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER
The operationalisation of the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) 
developed by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on the 
basis of European law entails identifying third countries (from 
outside the EU) vis-à-vis which domestic credit institutions have 
significant exposures. The aim of this identification is to smooth 
the prevention and mitigation of the transmission of cyclical 
systemic risks, derived from excessive credit growth in these 
countries, towards EU countries via European banks’ exposures. 
The identification of a “material third country” empowers an EU 
Member State’s designated national authority to set, where 
appropriate, a CCyB rate for domestic institutions’ credit 
exposures to that third country when it is considered that the rate 
set by the local authorities is insufficient.
With a view to contributing to the uniform setting of the CCyB by 
the EU Member States in their exposures to a same non-EU 
country, the ESRB issued a recommendation1 on the recognition 
and setting of CCyB rates for exposures to third countries. The 
Banco de España has adopted this recommendation along with 
the methodology for identification proposed by the ESRB.2 
This methodology stipulates that for a country to be identified as 
material, the exposures to that country must be greater than 1% of 
total exposures in at least one of three categories: i) original exposures, 
ii) risk-weighted exposures, and iii) defaulted exposures. This 
threshold must be simultaneously exceeded in the last quarter, 
the penultimate quarter and by the average of the eight quarters 
prior to the reference date (31 December of the year prior to 
the exercise). 
Against this background, the Banco de España has conducted 
in 2017 its second exercise for the identification of material 
third countries.3 As a result, six countries have been identified: 
United States, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Turkey and Peru. This list 
differs from that published the previous year (for the first time) for 
2016 owing to the inclusion of Peru, a country that slightly exceeds 
the materiality threshold in the risk-weighted exposures category. 
Although Spanish banks’ exposures to Peru have not changed 
significantly since the previous year, its inclusion is due to the 
reduction in the materiality threshold (from 2% to 1%) used. 
SOURCES: Banco de España, BIS and Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
a? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ????????????????
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????
????????????????? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ??????????? ????????
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1  ESRB Recommendation 2015/1 on recognising and setting of 
countercyclical buffer rates for exposures to third countries. 
2  ESRB Decision 2015/3 on the assessment of materiality of third 
countries for the Union’s banking system in relation to the recognition 
and setting of countercyclical buffer rates.
3  For details of the 2016 identification exercise, see FSR, November 2016, 
Chapter 3.
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BOX 3.2MATERIAL THIRD COUNTRIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER (cont’d)
This change seeks to align with the threshold used by the ESRB itself 
in the identification of material countries for the EU as a whole.4 
The results by exposure category are shown in Chart A, where in 
addition to material countries the two following countries in terms 
of significance of exposures (Colombia and Argentina) are 
included, in order to illustrate their current distance from 
the materiality threshold. The chart draws together the above-
mentioned minimum criteria into a single value by exposure 
category. This material-country-identification exercise is also 
conducted by each EU Member State, through their designated 
authorities, and by the ESRB for the EU as a whole.5 
For those countries identified as material, the ESRB 
recommendation stipulates that ongoing monitoring of the risk of 
excessive credit growth in these countries should be carried out, 
given the prospect that this could generate a risk to financial 
stability in Spain. To this end, the Banco de España has developed 
an early warning system based on the monitoring of four indicators 
capable of emitting signs of a build-up of cyclical systemic risk 
due to excessive credit growth.6 These indicators are part of the 
set used by the Banco de España for the setting of the CCyB 
in Spain: (i) credit-to-GDP gap (see Chart B), (ii) growth of house 
prices, (iii) credit intensity, and (iv) current account balance.
For those countries in which some type of warning is identified, 
the Banco de España performs a more detailed qualitative 
analysis. Although in some countries the values of certain 
indicators have slightly exceeded these thresholds, the result of 
the qualitative analysis does not identify clear warning signals 
about excessive credit growth in any of them. Accordingly, it is not 
considered necessary for the moment to set a CCyB rate for credit 
exposures to any of the material third countries.
4 ESRB Decision 2015/3.
5  The list of countries identified in the EU in 2016 can be seen in 
“A Review of Macroprudential Policy in the EU in 2016” – Section 4.2, 
April. ESRB (2017).
6  The warnings have been defined in the event of the value of these 
indicators exceeding certain thresholds based on the historical distributions 
of these countries in each indicator. The setting of the thresholds is based 
on those used by the ESRB for the monitoring of the countries identified as 
material for the EU as a whole in ESRB (2017): “ESRB Risk Monitoring 
Framework for Third Countries” (internal document).
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4 ANNEX
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. June 2017 data.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a It does not include the bank resolved in June 2017 in order to avoid distortions in the analysis of the results for the Spanish banking system and the comparison 
between periods.
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS
The Banco de España publishes various types of documents that provide information on 
its activity (economic reports, statistical information, research papers, etc.). The full list of 
Banco de España publications can be found on its website at http://www.bde.es/f/
webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Relacionados/Fic/Catalogopublicaciones.pdf.
Most of these documents are available in pdf format and can be downloaded free of charge 
from the Banco de España website, http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/. 
A request for others can be made to the following e-mail address: publicaciones@bde.es.

